NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

MARINE FORCES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT

by

Antonio L. Borrego

March 2019

Thesis Advisor:	Edward H. Powley IV
Co-Advisor:	William D. Hatch II

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		*Form Approved OMB* *No. 0704–0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	2. REPORT DATE March 2019	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE MARINE FORCES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT			**5. FUNDING NUMBERS** RSM1X
6. AUTHOR(S) Antonio L. Borrego			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Marine Forces Reserve, New Orleans, LA 93924; Marine Forces Reserve, New			**10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE** A

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

   Culture is a human concept central to the existence of societies. Perceptions of an organization's culture are based on individual thought coalescing into group consensus. Cultural disparities may have evolved between active units and the Marine Forces Reserve due to variances in law, practice, and involvement in the non-military world. This research sought to define the cultural perceptions that active component and reserve Marines have toward active forces and Marine Forces Reserve. Cultures were measured using Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn's Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument. Analysis considered the potential impact of status as an officer or enlisted member, a reservist's region of service, and assignment in a major subordinate command of service.

   The analysis indicated active and reserve Marines have closely aligned perspectives of active forces. Status as an officer or enlisted member and reservists' region of service positively impacted cultural alignment. Perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve differed between active and reserve members. Alignment was negatively impacted by Reservists' region of service, assignment within a major subordinate command, and status as an officer or enlisted member. The study showed reservists should integrate smoothly into active culture, and active members may experience some difficulty integrating into Marine Forces Reserve's culture.

14. SUBJECT TERMS culture, competing values framework, organizational culture assessment instrument, OCAI, CVF, I-I, Inspector-Instructor, Marine Forces Reserve			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 133
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** Unclassified	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** Unclassified	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

MARINE FORCES RESERVE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT

Antonio L. Borrego
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps Reserve
BS, North Carolina State University at Raleigh, 2002
MPA, University of Oklahoma, 2007

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2019**

Approved by: Edward H. Powley IV
             Advisor

             William D. Hatch II
             Co-Advisor

             Latika Hartmann
             Academic Associate, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Culture is a human concept central to the existence of societies. Perceptions of an organization's culture are based on individual thought coalescing into group consensus. Cultural disparities may have evolved between active units and the Marine Forces Reserve due to variances in law, practice, and involvement in the non-military world. This research sought to define the cultural perceptions that active component and reserve Marines have toward active forces and Marine Forces Reserve. Cultures were measured using Kim S. Cameron and Robert E. Quinn's Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument. Analysis considered the potential impact of status as an officer or enlisted member, a reservist's region of service, and assignment in a major subordinate command of service.

The analysis indicated active and reserve Marines have closely aligned perspectives of active forces. Status as an officer or enlisted member and reservists' region of service positively impacted cultural alignment. Perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve differed between active and reserve members. Alignment was negatively impacted by Reservists' region of service, assignment within a major subordinate command, and status as an officer or enlisted member. The study showed reservists should integrate smoothly into active culture, and active members may experience some difficulty integrating into Marine Forces Reserve's culture.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

xi

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

OCAI   Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument

Military Rank Structure

Officer Grades   First Lieutenant (O1), Second Lieutenant (O2), Captain (O3), Major (O4), Lieutenant Colonel (O5), Colonel (O6), Brigadier General (O7), Major General (O8), Lieutenant General (O9), and General (O10).

Enlisted Grades   Private (E1), Private First Class (E2), Lance Corporal (E3), Corporal (E4), Sergeant (E5), Staff Sergeant (E6), Gunnery Sergeant (E7), Master Sergeant or First Sergeant (E8), Master Gunnery Sergeant or Sergeant Major (E9)

Military Rank Groupings

Company Grade   O1 through O3

Field Grade   O4 through O6

General Officer   O7-O10

NCO   Non-Commissioned Officer: E4 through E5

SNCO   Staff Non-Commissioned Officer: E6 through E9

Senior SNCO   Senior Staff Non-Commissioned Officer: E8 through E9

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I.   INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately, people are unaware of their culture until it is challenged, until they experience a new culture, or until it is made overt and explicit through, for example, a framework or model.

—Cameron and Quinn, 2011

Culture is defined by Cameron and Quinn as "implicit assumptions that define the human condition and its relationship to the environment" (2011, Kindle Location 516–18). Culture is the human experience, creating normalcy for actions and reactions to our environment. Two cultures with minimal understanding of one another may experience dissonance when interacting. Foreign cultures may lead to difficult interactions. Near-equivalent cultures may consider slight differences confounding.

A.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The known dissonance between the active and reserve cultures within Marine Forces Reserve created an environment where Marine Forces Reserve's leadership requested assistance to define the cultural differences between active and reserve members to "reduce friction and enable operational effectiveness" (Leonard, Hernandez, & Hatch, 2017, 6). Comparing and contrasting active and reserve cultures requires understanding both cultures through the eyes of those experiencing those cultures. Defined cultures should yield informed policy and practice recommendations to bridge the gaps and create a more cohesive whole.

Research Question 1: How do active component and reservists view the culture of Marine Forces Reserve and active duty units?

Reservists have the potential to live their lives in one location, becoming a member of the local populace, consuming and exuding the traits of their chosen home. Divergent experiences from the active component norm, likely impacted by their region of reserve assignment, may cause differences in perspective of active unit culture

1

Research Question 2: Does a reservists' region of assignment impact reservists' view of active units?

Reservists mobilize to support the active forces as national need dictates and may participate in exercises around the globe regularly. They must be able to interact with both active component officer and enlisted members with equal ease. The variances of reserve life within the officer and enlisted ranks may cause varying outlooks of active units.

Research Question 3: Does status as an officer or enlisted member of either the active component or reserves impact perceptions of active unit culture?

Active component members normally receive orders to serve in an active duty unit, which is composed of a sampling of personnel from across the United States. The randomness of a unit's composure should yield a culture more influenced by the Marine Corps culture than by regional variances. Active component members receiving orders to Inspector-Instructor staffs interact with reservists who live the majority of their lives inside a region's culture. These regional differences may shift interactions best practices between Inspector-Instructor staff members and reservists.

Research Question 4: Does assignment region impact the integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve?

Active component Marines serving within Marine Forces Reserve work with reserve officer leadership to train a mostly enlisted reserve cadre. Differences between the culture opinions of officer and enlisted members of both components within Marine Forces Reserve may impede optimal training of reservists.

Research Question 5: Does status as an officer or enlisted member of either the active component or reserves impact perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve's culture?

Familiarity should breed understanding of an unfamiliar culture. It is possible active component member's cultural perspective of Marine Forces Reserve shifts during their tour within Marine Forces Reserve.

Research Question 6: Does active component perspective on Marine Forces Reserve's culture evolve toward reservists' perspective during their tour as a member of an Inspector-Instructor staff?

Assignment within Marine Forces Reserve normally occurs within one of the four major subordinate commands, with each having a distinct mission and goal. Different missions and goals may lead to differing cultural discernments.

Research Question 7: Does service within Marine Forces Reserve's major subordinate commands impact cultural perspectives of reservists?

The findings of these research questions will guide recommendations to bridge any gaps found between the active component and reservists within Marine Forces Reserve. Minimized variances should help Marine Forces Reserve better train its reservists, theoretically helping to "reduce friction and enable operational effectiveness" (Leonard, Hernandez, & Hatch, 2017, 6) during the integration of active and reserve Marines within Marine Forces Reserve and within active units.

B.   HISTORY OF THE RESERVES

The Marine Corps did not have a reserve force for the first 143 years of its existence. The situation changed in 1916 when Congress established a Marine Forces Reserve. Europe had been at war since 1914, with the U.S. divided about entry into the conflict. Congress determined a reserve force may provide a resource to quickly mobilize forces if pulled into conflict. On April 6, 1917, Congress approved President Wilson's request to declare war on the Imperial German Government. By 1919, the U.S. military had tripled in size to a peak of near 2.8 million service members, a more than tripling of the military's size during the Civil War (Department of Defense Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, 1997). The rapid growth proved the Reserves value as a national defense construct.

The 1916 institutionalization of the Marine Corps Reserve was the beginning of componency, in this case defined as subunits of a greater organization with separate uses or rules. Marine Corps Reservists were created as citizens who assumed rank and benefits when in service. Different pay scales, times for pay, authorizations for uniform, and other rules created disparities between the active and reserve components. The next century found regularly evolving statutes surrounding the Marine Corps Reserves as Congress

created the American version of a reserve force. Each new rule further cemented the differences between the active and reserve components (Marine Forces Reserve, 2016).

C.   MARINE FORCES RESERVE MANPOWER SOURCING

Marine Forces Reserve encompasses nearly 44,000 Marines comprised of three components: Selected Marine Corps Reservists (hereby noted as Reservists), active component Marines, and active reserve Marines. Each component brings with it a different culture, which in combination to create the culture of Marine Forces Reserve. The majority of Marine Forces Reserve is made up of reservists who are mandated by law to serve 48 drill periods and one annual training period of at least 14 days (10 U.S. Code § 10147, 2002). The next largest group within Marine Forces Reserve is active component members. The active force offers over 4,000 of its authorized 186,100 to serve on Inspector-Instructor staffs. These Marines are responsible for managing the daily coordination needed to run the operations of Marine Forces Reserve. The final group within Marine Forces Reserve is made up of active reserve Marines, who provide nearly 2,000 members to the organization. These Marines are a part of a small program of 2,261 reservists who permanently serve on active duty to support the Marine Corps Reserve Program. Figure 1 displays the investment by various components in training and administering Marine Forces Reserve. Statutory and policy differences between components create differences in methods of use, goals, and the overall bureaucracy surrounding the components.

Note: Marine Forces Reserve's active duty support includes over 6,000 Marines from both the Active Component and Active Reserve Program. The Active Component gives nearly 2% of its total end strength and the Active Reserve Program nearly 90%. This small cadre supports the training, administration and logistics for Marine Forces Reserves' 38,600 reservists.

Source: Reserve Affairs, personal communication [Reserve Personnel Strength PowerPoint slides], 2018).

Figure 1.   Inspector-Instructor staffs as a percentage of components

D.   RECRUITING

Recruiting for the active and reserve components is done by active component recruiters; however, different rules surround the policies of each. Active component enlisted Marines may or may not enter the service knowing their occupational specialty. Circumstances and service need will dictate their ability to have a larger choice in their future trade. Active component accessions enter the Marine Corps without the option to select assignment location. Reservists are recruited with a particular billet and unit in mind. Reservists leave for basic training well aware of their future specialty and reserve assignment. Reservists' prior understanding of unit location and specialty may set them apart from their active component counterparts. Reserve and active component officers commission without prior knowledge of specialization with the sole exceptions of active component lawyers and pilots. Officers learn their specialty and duty station location at varying times during their training pipeline, depending upon their component.

Marines assigned to the Active Reserve Program are solely recruited through prior-service Marines. Prior-service is defined as having served in either the active component or as a reservist. Marines, both enlisted and officer, must apply to access into the active reserve program from either the active or reserve component ranks.

E.   INITIAL TRAINING PIPELINE

1.   Enlisted Marines

Enlisted Marines must complete a 13-week boot camp before they are considered Marines, regardless of component. Completion of Boot Camp is followed by the School of Infantry or Marine Combat Training, which is followed by the final pipeline training at the appropriate military occupational school. Upon completion of the initial training pipeline, active component Marines receive orders to their first duty station.

Reservists differ from their active component brethren because at any point after completion of a school in the training pipeline they may return home and begin drilling with the reserves until they are ordered back to active duty the following year to continue training. Each break during the pipeline is effectively a long break from service not authorized for active component peers. Active component members may view long breaks between schools negatively and envy reservists the additional time with family and friends. Active Component Marines are limited to 30 days leave per year, which is always at the discretion of their command (10 U.S. Code § 701, 2016).

2.   Marine Corps Officers

Seven distinct programs manage the commissioning of officers. Active component officers hail from Enlisted Commissioning Programs, Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, or the Naval Academy. Reservist officers are commissioned through Reserve Enlisted Commissioning Program, Reserve Officer Commissioning Program, or Officer Candidate School. Every officer except those commissioned via the Naval Academy attend Officer Candidate School. Completion of Officer Candidate School gives citizens an opportunity to accept a commission with follow on orders to The Basic School, which teaches officers the tenets of officer ship. Officers from both components

who reach the final month of The Basic School are approved for a military occupational specialty. Reserve officers will also be assigned to a reserve unit upon the completion of The Basic School. Officers completing The Basic School receive orders to their specialization school, regardless of component. Completion of this final school finishes the initial training pipeline with active members given orders to their first unit and reservists released from active duty to begin drilling with their assigned unit. Unlike enlisted programs, an insufficient number of officers deviate from the pipeline to cause disparities between the components.

F.   REGULAR SERVICE

Active component officer and enlisted Marines receive orders to the Fleet Marine Forces after completion of their training pipeline. Active component Marines serve at the will of the greater institution for the remainder of the active duty obligation. Service can include multiple moves, multiple deployments with less than six months reprieve required before subsequent deployments, and regularly extended work hours. Enlisted Marines spend the first three to five years mastering their trade as a technician. Officers spend these same years honing their leadership and management skill sets. Active component Marines are beholden to the rules and regulations of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice during every moment of active service (10 U.S. Code § 802, 2016).

Enlisted members who choose to continue in service must reenlist and be promoted to a rank permitting longevity. Enlisted members are considered for promotion and enlistment amongst their own specialty. Officers gain longevity through promotions and achieving status as a career officer. Officers compete against officers in their year group for promotion opportunities, command, and full-length school, regardless of specialty— with the sole exception of Comptroller officers in the active component.

Enlisted and officer reservists return to their units upon completion of their initial training pipeline. Enlisted reservists immediately begin their lives as college students or working citizens while completing weekend drills. This pattern continues interrupted annually to participate in annual training periods of 14–17 days (10 U.S. Code § 10147, 2002). Enlisted members may be fortunate enough to work in a unit that offers employment

to enlisted Marines from Privates to Master Gunnery Sergeants. In these rare cases, enlisted Marines can drill within their hometown for the duration of a 30-year career. This level of stability may be unpopular by active component peers who are required to move their families every two years or more (Marine Corps, 2014, 6–8).

Officers are currently offered an opportunity for a 12-month tour on active duty following initial training. This period offers them insights into the active forces and theoretically grows their leadership and management skills according to preferred Marine Corps methods (Marine Corps, 2018). Officers who choose not to accept the active duty tour will immediately check into their reserve unit and begin drilling. Officers who accept the tour will check into their unit and begin drilling after this tour concludes. Unlike enlisted reservists but similar to active component officers and enlisted members, reservist officers are unable to serve an entire career in one location. Officers are expected by policy to find a new duty station every three years (Marine Corps, 2018). Disallowing officers to serve in one location for a longer duration theoretically forces officers to widen their scope of experiences. Unlike their active counterparts, reservists do not receive assignments from Headquarters Marine Corps. Instead, officers are on their own to find their next assignment. Officers with robust networks of mentors and peers have a distinct advantage at finding the best opportunities. Similar to active component officers, Reserve officers compete for command, key billets, and full-length school opportunities.

Enlisted and officer reservists live within the level of personal stability they desire. The Marine Corps does not mandate reservists move their families. Reservists can expect to deploy as determined by elected officials or national emergency. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 required a heavy percentage of reservists to mobilize in support of combat operations; however, this is far from the norm over the past century. Reservists mobilize with the expectation of a 4:1 dwell to deployment ratio by policy (DoDI 1235.12, 2016). This means reservist rate a four-year reprieve from deployment for every year mobilized. This policy helps reservists balance two lives. There is a heavy cost of missed time in a civilian career. A reservist who misses an important promotion opportunity in civilian life may not find another similar opening for years. This is a sacrifice beyond those borne by active component Marines. Reservists not in a drill status, on annual training

orders, or mobilized, do not fall under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice or reap the benefits of service beyond Tricare medical and dental.

Active component Marines who do not serve with reservists may not understand the different sacrifices involved. They may see part-time Marines who only play at what an active component Marine considers his calling. Less than 2% of the active component are assigned to Marine Forces Reserve, with most serving as members of Inspector-Instructor staffs. The remaining 98% have minimal contact with reservists. An active component Marine's ability to understand the life of a reservist is distinctly handicapped.

Reservists have an advantage in understanding their active component peer with every reserve site across the U.S. having active component members on its staff. Reservists regularly interact with active component personnel and should gain a base understanding and respect for their culture from the moment they enter the Marine Corps. This interaction continues throughout reservist careers.

The Active Reserve Program provides a cadre of full-time reservist to serve as the conduit for reserve related expertise. Active reservists are statutorily tasked with training, equipping, recruiting, administrating and managing the logistics for Marine reservists (10 U.S. Code § 101, 2017). Marines enter the Active Reserve Program through either the active component or reserves. Enlisted Marines apply and are considered on a case-by-case basis for openings. Officers must apply to join the Active Reserve Program through semi-annual Accession Boards. Officers and enlisted Marines selected for this program may be trained in new specialization fields to meet program needs. The program maintains 2,261 Marines (2018 NDAA, 2018, Sect 412); of which 351 are officers.

The Active Reserve Program straddles the middle ground of both worlds because of its unique status it bequeaths on members as reservists serving on active duty. Active reserve Marines can expect career progression similar to active component Marines, including regular moves, competitive promotions, and falling under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice during every waking hour (10 U.S. Code § 802, 2016). Active reserve Marines can deploy regularly like active component members. The majority of active

reserve assignments are to Marine Forces Reserve, drastically limiting deployments outside of supporting a reserve unit mobilization.

G. BENEFITS

Active component and active reserve Marines are active duty service members with a generous compensation package, which includes significant non-pecuniary benefits. The compensation package includes full medical coverage for the member and family, full dental coverage for the member and discounted coverage for family members, a robust retirement package requiring a 20-year cliff vestment, 30 days of vacation annually, access to the education benefits, and housing and subsistence allowances.

Active reserve Marines may join from either the drilling reserve ranks or active component. Active reserve Marines who served in the reserves will have an opportunity to select a reserve retirement after 20 years of qualifying reserve service or an active duty retirement after 20 years of qualifying active duty service. It is nearly unheard of for an active reserve Marine to accept a reserve retirement in lieu of an active retirement. Active reserve Marines without reserve time will receive the same retirement as active component Marines (10 U.S. Code § 1030–1154).

Reservists' compensation package is less robust than benefits offered to Marines on active duty. Reservists' benefits include discounted medical and dental programs, access to deluded education benefits, and a generous retirement plan vested after 20 years of qualifying reserve service. Reserve retirements are normally received at 60 years of age but can be brought forward by three months intervals for every three months of continuous service on active duty orders. This benefit may shift reservist's retirement from 60 to 50 years of age; meaning the youngest enlisted member can receive benefits three years after retiring after 30 years of service and officers can draw retirement immediately upon retirement (10 U.S. Code § 12731, 2014).

H. TRANSITION BETWEEN COMPONENTS

Transition between these components is possible, but not equitable. Active component service is seen as the pinnacle of service in the Marine Corps. Marines who

transition from any other component into the active component are seen as having broken time in active service and may find it more difficult to attain desirable billets and promotions. Active component Marines transitioning into the reserves or the active reserve program are held with esteem due to their active duty time. Marines transitioning from the active reserve program to the reserves or vice versa do not experience any penalty of transitioning as long as they do not transition regularly. A summary of differences by component can be found in Tables 1 through Table 3.

Table 1. Differences by component

	Active Component	Reservists	Active Reservists
Regular Service	Falls under Uniformed Code of Military Justice daily	Falls under Uniformed Code of Military Justice when drilling or on active orders	Falls under Uniformed Code of Military Justice
Deployment	Deploys at will of service	Limited on regularity of deployment	Deploys at will of service
Transition between Components	Transitioning to active component from another is considered broken time.	Any transition is viewed positively with experience valued	Any transition is viewed positively with experience valued
Medical	Full benefits	Must pay for benefits	Full Benefits
Dental	Heavily discounted	Must pay for benefits	Heavily discounted
Vacation	30 days annually	None unless on active duty orders	30 days annually
Retirement	Vested at 20 years of active service. Immediate receipt.	Vested at 20 years of qualifying reserve service. Receipt at 60, as early as 50.	Can receive either a reserve or active retirement

Table 2.   Enlisted differences by component

	Active Component	Reservists	Active Reservists
Recruiting	Recruited potentially with an agreed upon occupation	Recruited with a future unit and occupation known	Only recruited from reservist or active component ranks
Becoming a Marine	Attends boot camp and training pipeline without a break.	Attends boot camp and training pipeline with possible break between each event	Cannot be recruited at this point to the active reserve program.
Promotions	Competes against members of specialty in the active component	Promotion is among those with varying level of participation in the reserves	Competes against members of specialty in the active reserves
Continuing in Service	Must promote and reenlist at regular intervals. Will be regularly reassigned at 2- to 6-year intervals	Must promote and reenlist at regular intervals. May serve 30-year career at one unit if positions through E9 available	Must promote and reenlist at regular intervals. Regularly reassigned at 2–6-year intervals

Table 3.   Officer differences by component

	Active Component	Reservists	Active Reservists
Recruiting	Recruited with at most an aviation contract. Sourced from multiple programs.	Sourced from multiple programs but does not produce aviators.	Only recruited from active component and reserve forces.
Becoming a Marine	Attends Officer Candidate School, unless a Naval Academy Graduate, The Basic School, and specialization schooling.	Attends Officer Candidate School, The Basic School, and specialization schooling. It is possible to do so with breaks between schools but occurs rarely.	Cannot be recruited at this point to the active reserve program.
Promotions	Competes against all officers for promotion except comptrollers who solely compete against comptrollers	Competes against all reservist officers for promotions	Competes against all active reserve officers for promotion
Continuing in Service	Must promote at regular intervals to continue in service. Will be reassigned at 2- to 6-year intervals.	Must promote at regular intervals. Must shift units every 3–4 years.	Must promote at regular intervals to continue in service. Reassigned at 2–6-year intervals.

I. INSPECTOR-INSTRUCTOR DUTY

The combined staffing of over 4,000 active component Marines and over 2,000 active reservists combine to form Inspector-Instructor staffs tasked with the operations, logistics, and administration of Marine Forces Reserve. Service on an Inspector-Instructor staff is not an easy assignment. Inspector-Instructor staffs must coordinate with reserve leadership to plan and accomplish reserve operations. Active component and active reserve members without an active reserve counterpart find themselves shouldering the entire burden of reserve operations, logistics, administration, and management of reserve units who are similarly manned and equipped as active duty units. These mirrored requirements are condensed into 28 days of planning and preparation and two days of execution, supported by a skeletal staff of active duty planners and managers compared to active units.

Furthermore, Inspector-Instructor staffs within Marine Forces Reserve serve as the Marine Corps' sole source of community support and outreach in a vast portion of the U.S. Geographic independence places the support of local organizations, Toys for Tots, community events, and the funerals of Marine Corps veterans into the arms of those same skeletal Inspector-Instructor staffs.

J. SUMMARY

Marine Forces Reserve's product is the capability reserve units and Marines offer to the active forces. This capability arises through the efforts of active component and active reservist support of Marine Forces Reserve through their participation in Inspector-Instructor staffs. Optimization of reserve unit and reservist capabilities occurs when the three components work in a near-perfect union. Understanding the cultural perspectives of the components, particularly those differences between the active component and reservists, has the potential of improving the quality of reserve units and reservists.

The remainder of this thesis will delve into the cultural differences between reservists and active component members by focusing on their perceptions of active units and Marine Forces Reserve. Chapter II provides a literature review of the current and historical information surrounding the study of culture; including an analysis of the selected culture-measuring instrument. Chapter III details the methodology used to define

culture, including instrument modifications. Chapter IV reports the results based on varying perspectives and levels of organization. Chapter V summarizes the research, provides recommendations, and offers future research opportunities.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The management of organizational culture serves as one of the greatest pathways toward bringing about change. Understanding culture requires an understanding of a purely human construct. Jung et al., found over 70 instruments to measure culture in 2009. A majority of these instruments hail from U.S.-based studies. Jung et al. note culture continually evolves and is neither a good nor a bad construct. Instruments measuring culture vary greatly (Jung et al., 2009). The authors noted there are generally two methods of measurement used in determining culture: normative and ipsative. The normative method asks respondents to evaluate culture using a category or scale, similar to a Likert scale. The ipsative method asks respondents to make choices about different options, giving weighted preferences to each.

Cameron and Quinn's Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) was the sole method focused toward the ipsative method among the instruments reviewed (www.psychology.iresearchnet.com, n.d.). Cameron and Quinn's OCAI uses the ipsative method to force respondents to allocate points among four questions in six groups of questions. The ratio created shows individual opinions toward one of four culture types. Cameron and Quinn's tool is designed to help organizations understand their own culture and has been used by more than "100,000 managers representing more than 10,000 organizations" (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 1355).

Cameron and Quinn's OCAI is a tool derived from the Competing Values Framework. The Competing Values Framework has continually evolved since published in Quinn and Rohrbaugh's "A Spatial Model of Effectiveness Criteria" in 1983. Competing Values Framework seeks to define culture as internal or external and stable or flexible (Cameron & Ettington, 1988). The concepts determined by this early study continued to be refined by Cameron through their 2011 publication of "Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture," which serves as the basis of this study.

Numerous studies have found Cameron and Quinn's OCAI to be a valid tool in judging culture (Cameron & Ettington, 1988; Jung, 2009; Paparone, 2003). Hartnell, Ou,

and Kinicki (2011) found the OCAI can determine an organization's cultural propensities and focuses management on using strengths and improving weaknesses. Lund found the OCAI method useful for defining level of job satisfaction by type of culture with higher satisfaction not associated with better performance (2003). Howard, in his 1998 study, found OCAI's was a valid instrument to compare institutions. Kwan and Walker confirmed Howard's assumption in their 2004 study. Suderman's 2012 study showed OCAI results could shift an organization toward a new culture. OCAI has also been used in other countries with vastly different cultures, including China, (Yu & Wu, 2009; Ralston et al., 2001), Korea (Choi, Scott, & Martin, 2010) and Qatar (Al-Khalifa & Aspinwall). Some researchers have questioned OCAI's statistical validity (Helfrich, Li, Mohr, Meterko, and Sales, 2007), while others believe the instrument to be statically sound (Heritage, Polluck, & Roberts, 2014).

Cameron and Quinn's OCAI was used in 2010 to evaluate the current and needed future posture of the U.S. Army according to senior army officers. Pierce's research found the Army was heavily focused internally through rules and regulations (*hierarchy)* when senior officers believed an army which was more creative and externally *(adhocracy)* focused was better suited to the operational environment. The results of this study validated OCAI's use as an instrument in military settings and proved it can compare two disparate cultures types; in this case labeled current culture and future desired culture. The army's current culture according to the study is by ratio: nearly 38% results-oriented, 28% focused on rules, regulations and hierarchy, 22% family-oriented, with the remaining 12% focused on creativity. The preferred culture is a shift from controlling to innovative (Pierce, 2010).

In 2014, Dr. Anthony Pollman, a retired Marine Corps Major, conducted a culture study of Marine Corps Officers assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School. Pollman found the culture of Marine Corps students assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School to be 35% focused on results orientation, 30% driven by rules and hierarchy, 21% given to a family-like atmosphere, and 13% allocated toward creativity. His results showed similar answers from company and field grade officers with differences between aviation centric, ground, and support officers (Pollman, 2015). The results from Pollman's study nearly match those

found by Pierce's 2010 study and show the army and Marine Corps may be culturally closer together than either service believes.

A second Marine Corps study by Pollman in 2018 provided unique insights comparing data from Pierce's 2010 study, a survey of Marine leaders from a conference, and a summary from a war college assessment. Pollman found the Marine Corps culture was not significantly different from Army cultures. He further noted the survey specifically highlighted how each organization's surveyed personnel do not believe their service has a culture supportive of creativity and innovation. To foster change, the Marine Corps will need to assess its cultural norms and strive to create an environment where change is an acceptable part of the cultural make-up. Pollman's research included surveying senior Marines within Marine Forces Reserve during an annual Marine Forces Reserve Inspector-Instructor Conference.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. METHODOLOGY

A. INSTRUMENT SELECTION

The flexibility of Cameron and Quinn's OCAI to compare across groups made it the optimal instrument for analysis in this research. The OCAI asks respondents to answer six sets of questions (2011, Kindle location 668–672). Each set allows respondents to allocate 100 points among four questions. The point spread among the four questions creates a ratio of strength among four culture types: clan, adhocracy, market, and hierarchy. Combining responses of culture types across the six sets of questions reveals an individual's ratio of the four culture types. Combining averages across multiple individuals results in a group ratio, which can be analyzed and compared to other groups. Ratios provide insights as to the strengths and weaknesses of the four culture types.

The OCAI is designed to evaluate current and desired future cultural state but may be modified to suit other needs. Shifting current and future state to perspective of two types of organizations permits this research to study opinions of active units and Marine Forces Reserve. Surveying active and Reservists on their opinions of active units and Marine Forces Reserve should provide insights into each.

B. INSTRUMENT

1. OCAI's Four Types of Culture

Cameron and Quinn designed OCAI to box cultural views into four distinct culture typologies. The typologies can be visualized as occurring in a box divided into four quadrants. The two left quadrants are focused internally; with the right quadrants focused externally. The two upper quadrants speak to flexible culture; while the two lower boxes speak to an organization seeking structure and stability. The quadrants can also be defined as: 1) clan in the upper left as internal and flexible; shown in yellow, 2) adhocracy in the upper right as external and flexible; shown in green, 3) market in the lower right as external and structured; shown in blue, and 4) hierarchy in the lower left; shown in red. The associated colors are represented throughout the tables and graphs in the remainder of this study. A graphical depiction of the four-quadrant structure is provided in Figure 2.

Figure 2. OCAI culture graph

a.   *Clan, Collaborative Culture (Internal, Flexible)*

Cameron and Quinn describe clan as the family culture of the culture types; focused on collaboration. Leadership in the clan culture facilitates, builds teams, and focuses on mentoring staff, possibly considered a parent-figure. Organizations with a strong clan culture treat employees like family and consider their customers partners. Teamwork is central to organizations strong in clan culture. Sharing personally is expected among employees. The focus of the clan culture is building human capital (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 862–898; E. Powley & A. Borrego, personal communication [PowerPoint slides], 2018).

b. *Adhocracy, Create Culture (External, Flexible)*

This type of culture is designed to be adaptable, with a focus on creativity. Leadership should be pioneering and imaginative. Flexibility in this case helps lead to a creative, adaptable environment. Those with an adhocracy focus are found to be entrepreneurial. Adhocracy often is found strongly in fluid or young organizations. Organization strong in adhocracy seek creativity to find new solutions and resources (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 911–945; Powley & A. Borrego, personal communication [PowerPoint slides], 2018).

c. *Market, Compete Culture (Internal, Flexible)*

The market culture strives to create the optimal environment supportive of results orientation or competitiveness with an external base. Leadership drives toward success. Rules are designed to optimize external efficiency, which may be at the cost of internal effectiveness. The organization finds success through consumer-focused operations driving for market supremacy. (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 817–862; Powley & A. Borrego, personal communication [PowerPoint slides], 2018).

d. *Hierarchy, Control Culture (Internal, Stable)*

Cameron and Quinn describe the hierarchy culture as one that is a bureaucratic, controlling form of management. Rules and hierarchy drive success. Leaders are expected to be organized with the ability to work across teams and follow work throughput. Employees work within strict confines of their jobs with little freedom as to the conduct of work. Standardization is sought after by cultures strong in hierarchy. Bureaucracies, factories, and fast food businesses tend to have hierarchy culture tendencies (2011, Kindle location 794–817; Powley & A. Borrego, personal communication [PowerPoint slides], 2018).

2. Using OCAI to Evaluate an Organization

Respondents answering the OCAI survey are asked to respond to six sets of questions. Each set consists of four questions. Each question forces respondents to consider one of the four culture types. Averaging responses across each set of four questions yields

an individual perspective of the organization's culture type, shown in Figure 3. The average points for each culture are then placed in the appropriate quadrant and linked via lines to form a quadrilateral representative of the individual or organization's culture. A culture equally spread across all four quadrants creates a square profile.

Figure 3.   Image displaying how OCAI four culture averages are computed across six sets of four questions

The sample culture graph shown in Figure 4 displays an organization strongest in the clan culture and weakest in adhocracy. The respondent, or average of respondents, equally values stability and flexibility with an equal spread between the top and bottom halves of the four quadrants. Within the clan and adhocracy quadrants of the upper half, clan pulls a greater percentage of the ratio by pulling from adhocracy. The sample organization would have a stronger cultural focus toward a family-type (*clan)* culture at the cost of creativity (*adhocracy)* among its ranks.

Figure 4.   Sample OCAI culture graph

Two organizations can have similar OCAI graphs, albeit for different reasons. Determining the underlying differences for a similar four culture averages requires analysis by dimension. Dimensional details are found individually by measuring the allocation of 100 points among the four questions in each set, with each question representing either the clan, adhocracy, market, or hierarchy type of culture. The ratio created by responses to one set of question show which culture type is strongest and weakest by ratio by dimension.

Each set of four questions represents one dimension with the dimension's title showing on the first line. The four questions, labeled A to D, are labeled with the appropriate culture type's color in the response cell on the right. Averaging ratios by dimension across multiple respondents provides a group perspective. Organizations viewed through dimensions show additional clarity as to how the four culture types interact with the organization's culture as defined by the surveyed individuals. The greater detail

provided through analyzing by dimension should improve recommendations designed to shift an organization's culture. Figure 5 displays the OCAI survey.

1. Dominant Characteristics		Now	2. Organizational Leadership		Now
A	The organization is a very personal place. It is like an extended family. People seem to share a lot of themselves.		A	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing.	
B	The organization is a very dynamic entrepreneurial place. People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks.		B	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating, or risk taking.	
C	The organization is very results oriented. A major concern is with getting the job done. People are very competitive and achievement oriented.		C	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive, results-oriented focus.	
D	The organization is a very controlled and structured place. Formal procedures generally govern what people do.		D	The leadership in the organization is generally considered to exemplify coordinating, organizing, or smooth-running efficiency.	
	Total			Total	

3. Management of Employees		Now	4. Organization Glue		Now
A	The management style in the organization is characterized by teamwork, consensus, and participation.		A	The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and mutual trust. Commitment to this organization runs high.	
B	The management style in the organization is characterized by individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom, and uniqueness.		B	The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to innovation and development. There is an emphasis on being on the cutting edge.	
C	The management style in the organization is characterized by hard-driving competitiveness, high demands, and achievement.		C	The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on achievement and goal accomplishment. Aggressiveness and winning are common themes.	
D	The management style in the organization is characterized by security of employment, conformity, predictability, and stability in relationships.		D	The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and policies. Maintaining a smooth-running organization is important.	
	Total			Total	

5. Strategic Emphases		Now	6. Criteria of Success		Now
A	The organization emphasizes human development. High trust, openness, and participation persist.		A	The organization defines success on the basis of the development of human resources, teamwork, employee commitment, and concern for people.	
B	The organization emphasizes acquiring new resources and creating new challenges. Trying new things and prospecting for opportunities are valued.		B	The organization defines success on the basis of having the most unique or newest products. It is a product leader and innovator.	
C	The organization emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. Hitting stretch targets and winning in the marketplace are dominant.		C	The organization defines success on the basis of winning in the marketplace and outpacing the competition. Competitive market leadership is key.	
D	The organization emphasizes permanence and stability. Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important.		D	The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency. Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling and low-cost production are critical.	
	Total			Total	

Figure 5.   OCAI question sets by dimensions with questions highlighted by culture type

Cameron and Quinn note the following of the dimensions of culture:

These dimensions are not comprehensive, of course, but they address basic assumptions (dominant characteristics, organizational glue), interaction patterns (leadership, management of employees), and organizational direction (strategic emphases, criteria of success) that typify the fundamentals of culture. (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 645–8)

Six content dimensions serve as the basis for the OCAI: 1. The dominant characteristics of the organization, or what the overall organization is like. 2. The leadership style and approach that permeate the organization. 3. The management of employees or the style that characterizes how employees are treated and what the working environment is like. 4. The organizational glue or bonding mechanisms that hold the organization together. 5. The strategic emphases that define what areas of emphasis drive the organization's strategy. 6. The criteria of success that determine how

victory is defined and what gets rewarded and celebrated. (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 2504–19)

Responses by dimension and category type are shown in a table format to simplify the reader's ability to digest six dimensions, four culture types, and varying amounts of categories. Organizations or categories are shown in rows and with the six dimensions represented in columns. Each cell will have the appropriate culture type highlighted in the colors used in the OCAI four culture type charts to distinguish the strongest type of culture in each dimension. If a second culture type is within one ratio point of the primary, it will be represented by its first letter in parenthesis. For example, an organization with the strongest ratio given clan culture with market found to be within one point by ratio will be shown as "Clan (M)" in a yellow cell. Table 4 shows comparable inclinations in dominant characteristic, organizational leadership, and management of employees.

The organization in Table 4 would find recommendations centered on the final three traits with minimal change needed in organizational glue and strategic emphasis due to dominant trait of one organization matching one of the two dominant traits in the other organization. Recommendations would focus on improving understanding across the components in criteria of success to help bring their perspectives together.

Table 4.   Sample table of dimensions

Component	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Organization 1	Clan	Market	Hierarchy	Adhocracy	Adhocracy (M)	Clan
Organization 2	Clan (M)	Market	Hierarchy	Hierarchy (A)	Clan (A)	Adhocracy

Analysis by dimension offers understanding of culture within more specific criteria. These specificities increase the accuracy of both the understanding of cultural intricacies and paths toward bridging cultural differences. Cultural results by dimension and type of culture are defined in Figure 6.

Collaborate Culture
- An organization that focuses on internal maintenance with flexibility.
- **Dominant Organizational Characteristics**: The dominant orientation is a concern for people and is a sensitive and friendly place to work where people share a lot of themselves. It is like an extended family.
- **Leadership Style**: The leaders, or head of the organization, are considered to be mentors and, maybe even, parent figures.
- **Management of Employees**: The organization places a premium on teamwork, participation and consensus.
- **Organizational Glue**: The organization is held together by loyalty or tradition. Commitment is high.
- **Strategic Emphasis**: The organization emphasizes the long term benefit of human resources development with high cohesion and moral being important.
- **Criteria for Success**: Success is defined in terms of sensitivity to customers and concern for people.

Create Culture
- An organization that focuses on external positioning with a high degree of flexibility and individuality.
- **Dominant Organizational Characteristics**: A dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks.
- **Leadership Style**: The leaders are considered to be innovators and risk takers.
- **Management of Employees**: The organization encourages individual initiative and freedom.
- **Organizational Glue**: The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to experimentation being on the leading edge.
- **Strategic Emphasis**: Readiness for change and to meet new challenges are important. The organization's long term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources.
- **Criteria for Success**: Success means having unique and new products, or services. Being a product, or service, leader is important.

Control Culture
- An organization that focuses on internal maintenance with a need for stability and control.
- **Dominant Organizational Characteristics**: A very formalized and structured place to work. Procedures govern what people do.
- **Leadership Style**: The leaders pride themselves on being good coordinators, organizers, and efficiency minded. Maintaining a smooth running organization is most critical.
- **Management of Employees**: With respect to managing employees the concern is with secure employment and predictability.
- **Organizational Glue**: Formal rules and policies hold the organization together.
- **Strategic Emphasis**: The long term concern is on stability and performance with efficient, smooth operations.
- **Criteria for Success**: Success is defined in terms of dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low cost.

Compete Culture
- An organization that focuses on external positioning with a need for stability and control.
- **Dominant Organizational Characteristics**: A results oriented organization. The major concern is getting the job done. People are competitive and goal oriented.
- **Leadership Style**: The leaders are hard drivers, producers and competitors. They are tough and demanding.
- **Management of Employees**: The organizational style is hard-driving competitiveness.
- **Organizational Glue**: The glue that holds the organization together is an emphasis and success are common concerns.
- **Strategic Emphasis**: The long term concern is on competitive actions and achievement of measurable goals and targets.
- **Criteria for Success**: Success is defined in terms of market share and penetration. Competitive pricing and market leadership are important.

Figure 6.   Cultural definitions of each dimension by culture type. Source Cameron and Quinn (2011).

3.   OCAI Survey Modifications

The OCAI survey was modified from current and future views to views on Marine Forces Reserve and active duty units. The shift permitted comparison of perceived cultures of both organizations. Care was made to ensure changes to the OCAI questions were minimal; keeping the core concepts found in the OCAI instrument questions unsullied. Modifications were designed to draw respondents' focus toward Marine Forces Reserve or active duty units vice a generic organization while easing respondent's ability to understand the underlying dynamics of the survey's focus.

A demographics section was added to the survey to increase the study's depth. Requested information included length of service within Marine Forces Reserve, military occupational specialty, current command, and component or sub-component. Variables such as rank, race, ethnicity, gender, and time in service were not requested to protect

respondent anonymity. Service within Marine Forces Reserve was divided into seven sub-groups: 0–3 months, 3–6 months, 6–9 months, 9–12 months, 12–15 months, 15–18 months, and 18+ months service to analyze if perspective of Marine Forces Reserve evolves among active component members. Data was compiled into less than and more than 18 months of service during analysis.

The second question asked requested a four-digit occupational specialty code. Answers to this question yield multiple insights including occupational specialty defined in the first two digits and specifications in the second two digits contain generic information on spread of rank in a particular specialty and whether or not the specialty is assigned to officers or enlisted. Specialty rank spread is particularly important as, in some cases, it can delineate junior to senior without specifying exact ranks. Four-digit occupation specialties further permit analysis by occupation type. Occupation types may include multiple specialties in one similar grouping (Marine Corps, 2018).

The third question asked respondents to annotate assignment to 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Marine Logistics Group, or Force Headquarters Group. This question permits diagnosis of cultural norms across large organizations. Cultural norms assume there are differences between the personnel assigned to major commands. Terms such as "swing with the wing" have been around for decades, analysis by major command should evaluate organizational differences.

The final demographics question asks if a respondent is active component, reservist, or active reserve. This question allows separation of participants into the level of analysis required for this study. As noted in the introduction, experiences are different among the three groups, with active reserves members being a minimally important group for analysis. The active component's perspective allows determination of the outside perspective, especially when combined with time in service with Marine Forces Reserve.

4. Population Selection

Marine Forces Reserve requested a deeper understanding into how active duty and reservists view the cultures of Marine Forces Reserve and active units; specifically requesting insights into officers, Staff Non-Commissioned Officers (SNCOs) and other

designated staff. Officers include those who have received either warrants or commissions from Congress according to statute (10 U.S. Code § 531, 2004) (10 U.S. Code § 571, 2004). SNCOs include members of the Marine Corps who have been promoted to the rank of Staff Sergeant (E6) or above. Designated staff is defined as a Marine serving on an Inspector-Instructor staff or a reservist who is assigned to a reserve unit. Members were considered eligible to participate in the survey if they were assigned to Marine Forces Reserve as an active component Marine, a Marine reservist, or an active reserve Marine.

The determination of units to be surveyed was coordinated through major subordinate command Chiefs of Staffs with Marine Forces Reserve's staff serving as a conduit. Marine Forces Reserve provided four units from the east coast, central U.S., and west coast. Chiefs of Staffs of major subordinate commands selected units. Major subordinate command is defined as a command reporting to the Lieutenant General Commander of Marine Forces Reserve managed by a reserve Major General or Brigadier General. Major subordinate commands are responsible for the provision of reserve ground forces, aviation forces, logistics support forces, or other forces.

Each unit was asked to survey at least 30 individuals; including a variety of reserve and active component Marines across available ranks. Requested spread of reserve personnel was defined according to the proportions set by the Marine Corps Almanac (USMC Concepts & Programs, 2018). Inspector-Instructors were asked to ensure each of the following standards was represented in their active component population: Company Grade Officer, Field Grade Officer, E1-3, E4-5, E6-7, and E8-E9.

C.   DATA COLLECTION

Data was provided by Marine Forces Reserve through 855 surveys. Surveys were received in hardcopy, scanned, or via Excel spreadsheet. Surveys received electronically were stored and labeled during data entry without reference to the submitting individual.

Data was transferred into an excel spreadsheet within one week of receipt. Responses were entered and verified. When a set of questions' responses did not add to 100, responses answers were modified to maintain the same ratio. For example: If a respondent only used 50 of their 100 points by answering 15, 10, 10 and 15 to questions

4A, 4B, 4C, and 4D, responses were modified to 30, 20, 20, 30 forcing use of the entirety of the 100 points. Near 16% of survey respondents had at least one group of questions that did not add up to 100.

Twenty-five units, spread throughout the four major subordinate commands, participated in the surveying efforts, with 855 surveys successfully completed during surveying. Unit, unit location, major command, and geographical region were automatically compiled for each received survey, resulting in 100% accuracy in these demographics. Regions were defined as West, Midwest, South and Northeast as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau (Geography Division, n.d.). The U.S. Census Bureau's regional division is displayed in Figure 7. Navy personnel responded via 24 surveys. Their responses were not considered in this analysis, as the overarching goal is the comparison of active component and reservist Marines. Four of the Navy responses were from 4th Marine Division units, one from Force Headquarters Group and the remainder from 4th Marine Logistics Group. Removing the navy responses yielded 831 surveys.

Figure 7.   Regions of the U.S. according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
Source: Geography Bureau (n.d.).

Missing variables had varying levels of effect upon the results. Missing answers within the component code variable had the greatest impact as component code was the central variable used in dissecting and comparing data. Affiliation duration and military occupational specialty had minimal effect as the former were used to determine effects of cultural views as impacted by a longer duration of serving within Marine Forces Reserve. Military occupational specialty was used to specify specialty or status as an officer or enlisted member. Specific details on missing information is found in Table 5.

Table 5.   Missing variables data

Variable Noted	Affiliation Duration	Military Occupational Specialty	Component
Total Answered	801	766	811
Missing Values	30	165	20
Percent of Missing Values	3.61%	7.82%	5.15%

The spreadsheet used to compile survey data was automated to simplify analysis. Multiple worksheets permitted focus on the following: component, status as officer or enlisted, time in service within Marine Forces Reserve, and reservists' region of service. Responses were automatically filtered into competing values OCAI four culture type graphs (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, Kindle location 767). Dimension charts were manually created with information automatically produced during survey data entry. This report did not require IRB approval because the results are not generalizable and used for internal practice.

IV. RESULTS

The report's results will be provided in several sections. The first section analyzes the cultural perspectives of active component and reservist on both active units and Marine Forces Reserve. The second section provides insights into the impact culture has upon reservists integrating with active units when mobilizing. The third section shows cultural differences that may be experienced by active component members serving within Marine Forces Reserve. The fourth section displays the evolution of active component member's cultural perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve over the course of a tour as an Inspector-Instructor staff member. The final section will delve into the impact major subordinate command has upon reservists' cultural beliefs.

A. OVERALL RESULTS

Research Question 1: How do active component and reservists view the culture of Marine Forces Reserve and active duty units and what differs between perspectives?

Active component and reservists believe the cultures of active units and Marine Forces Reserve to be close to similar when analyzed through the scope of the four culture types. Differences between perspectives of how each component views each organization is at largest 1.86 points of variance on a scale of 100. Two ratios experiencing a difference of more than 5 points are noted as significant and vary enough to influence a cultural shift (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, kindle location 1298). The lack of differences of five points or more between the cultural perceptions shows the cultures of active units and Marine Forces Reserve are near similar according to active component members and reservists. Figure 8 provides an OCAI four-culture chart with the supporting data shown in Table 6.

Figure 8.　OCAI graph of active component and reservist perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve and active units

Table 6.　Data for active component and reservist perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve and active units

Component		Reservists		Active Component	
Population and View		View of Marine Forces Reserve Culture	View of Active Unit Culture	View of Marine Forces Reserve Culture	View of Active Unit Culture
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	27.9	26.8	26.4	26.4
	Adhocracy Create	20.0	19.9	20.1	19.9
	Market Compete	26.7	27.5	26.3	27.9
	Hierarchy Control	25.4	25.3	27.1	25.8
Difference from Reservists view	Clan Collaborative	1.56	0.42	N/A	
	Adhocracy Create	-0.12	-0.06		
	Market Compete	0.34	-0.33		
	Hierarchy Control	-1.71	-0.53		

32

Evaluation of active component and reservist opinions of Marine Forces reserve and active units by dimension opens up the aperture to details which may show differences between the components; which otherwise were not found in OCAI charts and data.

a. Dominant Characteristic of All Dimensions

Reservists and active component members concur the dominant culture of Marine Forces Reserve strives to *create* an enjoyable place to work where people believe they are part of a family *(clan)*. Reservists believe the same characteristics dominate the culture of active units. Active component members find family-like characteristics a strong part of their culture but not the primary cultural belief. The primary culture of active units according to active component members inclines toward results-orientation *(market)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

The *dominant characteristic* dimension should be considered in a different light than the remaining five dimensions. It is theoretically the overarching culture typology of an organization. In some situations, the remaining five dimensions will be similar across two perspectives with the *dominant characteristic* differing. In situations like this, minimal influence should be granted to the differentiated *dominant characteristic*. Instead, focus should be placed upon the interpretation of the other five dimensions. Outliers like this will be highlighted and discussed in the appropriate settings.

b. Organizational Leadership Dimension

The cultural perspective of *organizational leadership* dimension finds concurrence between active component and reservists when considering both active units and Marine Forces Reserve. *Organizational leadership* was found to be dominantly driven by mission accomplishment *(market)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

c. Management of Employees Dimension

There is a diverse set of opinions among active component and reservists as to the type of culture driving the management of employees. Active component and reservists believe active unit's *management of employees* in active units is accomplished through driving employees to dominate the market *(market)*. Active component members believe

33

Marine Forces Reserve is culturally propensed to manage employees via unanimity and teamwork *(clan)*. Reservists view Marine Forces Reserve's management culture to be focused on providing a dependable environment *(hierarchy)* (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). The variance of opinions of Marine Forces Reserve may increase the difficulties experienced by active component members serving within its ranks.

d.   *Organizational Glue Dimension*

There is agreement between active component members and reservists on active unit cultural in which culture type holds the organization together; however, active component members and reservists disagree as to which culture type creates cohesion within Marine Forces Reserve. Both components find active unit unity driven by strong ties to institutional tradition with members strongly committed to the mission and organization (*clan*). Reservists believe these traits also create cohesion within Marine Forces Reserve. Active component members instead believe Marine Forces Reserve is unified through strong adherence in statutes, policies, and practice *(market)*. (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

e.   *Strategic Emphasis Dimension*

This dimension finds active component members and reservists agreeing on the culture holding dominance in *strategic emphasis* in active units and Marine Forces Reserve, albeit those beliefs find a different type of culture driving active units and Marine Forces Reserve. Active units are institutionally focus on maintaining a competitive edge against other militaries *(market)*. Marine Forces Reserve's personnel are culturally focused on ensuring operations are well-planned and efficient *(hierarchy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

f.   *Criteria of Success Dimension*

Active component members and reservists disagree as to which culture type defines goal attainment within active units and agree as to which culture typology defines success in Marine Forces Reserve. Reservists find the *criteria of success* for active units is driven through military dominance across the globe *(market)*. Active component members believe

the success of active units and Marine Forces Reserve occur through fiscally responsible, well run operations *(hierarchy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Reservists concur with active component members in their view of how active units culturally define success. The differences noted in this section are found in Table 7.

Table 7.   View of active units and Marine Forces Reserve by component

Perspective of	Component	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Units	Reservists	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Market
	Active Component	Market (C)					Hierarchy
Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists	Clan	Market	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy	Hierarchy
	Active Comp			Hierarchy	Hierarchy (M)		

Discussions from here on will highlight differences between the categorical results and Table 7 results with the goal of highlighting how changes occur as reservists are categorized by region of service, status as an officer or enlisted, or by service within a major subordinate command. Similarities will be noted through heavy shading with no further detail given beyond those explained in the preceding section. Non-shaded cells will show differences from cultural perceptions of reservists sourced from Table 7 and noted as all or all reservists in future tables.

Table 8 provides an example of the type of table used in the analyses that follow. Table 8 shows concurrence with reservists in five of the six dimensions with differences solely found in the *criteria of success* dimension. Active component Marines' perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve in this category vary drastically from the cumulative answers by active component members. The cultural variances created or solved will be explained. The active component perspective on *dominant characteristic* through hierarchy (1a), market (1b), and adhocracy (1c) perspectives will be explained as to how each of those are defined. The shift in Active component's perspective in the *management of employees* dimension in Category 1c will show this category eliminates some stresses of active component integration due to similar cultural perspectives.

Table 8.   Example table by category

Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve	Component	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Reservists	All Reservists	CLAN	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN	MARKET	MARKET
	Category 1a	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Hierarchy
	Category 1b	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Clan
	Category 1c	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Adhocracy
Active Component	All Active Comp	CLAN	MARKET	CLAN	CLAN	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
	Category 1a	Hierarchy	Adhocracy	Clan	Clan	Market	Hierarchy
	Category 1b	Market	Market	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy	Market
	Category 1c	Adhocracy	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Adhocracy

Subspecialties in the military service may offer another perspective to see the propensities for cultural deviation. Subspecialties tend to work within confines of their trade with limited interaction to other subspecialties early in their military career. Promotions and evaluations tend to occur within a specialty. Leadership and mentoring are also internal affairs for most Marine Corps units. The relatively closed structure of specialties may lead to a culture within a culture. Analysis of subspecialties may yield intriguing insights as to if cultural opinions significantly when considered by subspecialty.

Active component responses toward active units and reservist responses toward Marine Forces Reserve were found to be centered on the average. Active component members had no responses on active units with a 5-point or greater difference over the average of active responses. Reservists had one response toward Marine Forces Reserve with a 5-point or greater differences over the average of reservist responses. When active component perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve by specialty and reservist perspectives of active units by specialty were considered the amount of significant differences increased drastically on both sides. The results show there is limited difference in how subspecialties view their own organization, but significant difference in how subspecialties view other organizations. These perspectives are shown in Tables 9 through Table 12. Yellow cells annotate low number of survey responses. Bold numbers show significant differences. Bold and underlined numbers show variances at the 10-point level.

Table 9. Data for active component perspectives of active units by sub-specialty

Population and view of active unit culture		Active Component	Active Component 01XX N=45	Active Component 03XX N=19	Active Component 06XX N=18	Active Component 08XX N=19	Active Component 11/13XX N=16	Active Component 04/30XX N=18	Active Component 35XX N=10	Active Component 6XXX N=10
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	27.79	25.79	26.58	25.26	25.89	24.81	25.98	27.17	23.47
	Adhocracy Create	19.29	21.83	19.26	18.75	20.12	17.97	21.60	22.58	23.72
	Market Compete	28.64	26.94	30.04	30.72	28.76	30.04	26.86	25.33	26.30
	Hierarchy Control	24.29	25.43	24.12	25.26	25.23	27.18	25.56	24.92	26.52
Difference from Active Component Average	Clan Collaborative	N/A	1.99	1.20	2.52	1.90	2.97	1.81	0.62	4.32
	Adhocracy Create		-2.54	0.03	0.54	-0.82	1.32	-2.30	-3.29	-4.42
	Market Compete		1.69	-1.40	-2.09	-0.13	-1.40	1.77	3.30	2.34
	Hierarchy Control		-1.15	0.17	-0.98	-0.95	-2.89	-1.28	-0.63	-2.23

Table 10. Data for reservist perspectives of active units by sub-specialty

Population and view of active unit culture		Reservists	Reservist 01XX N=28	Reservist 03XX N=49	Reservist 06XX N=73	Reservist 08XX N=30	Reservist 11/13XX N=52	Reservist 04/30XX N=41	Reservist 35XX N=44	Reservist 6XXX N=45
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	24.15	25.81	26.15	26.62	25.89	25.97	27.34	26.94	29.26
	Adhocracy Create	14.76	23.01	17.70	19.00	20.12	21.46	22.17	21.79	19.07
	Market Compete	30.27	26.50	30.82	29.36	28.76	27.09	24.87	26.84	24.21
	Hierarchy Control	30.82	24.68	25.24	23.65	25.23	25.48	25.62	24.43	27.46
Difference from Reservist Average	Clan Collaborative	N/A	-1.66	-2.00	-2.47	-1.74	-1.82	-3.19	-2.78	-5.11
	Adhocracy Create		-8.25	-2.95	-4.25	-5.36	-6.70	-7.41	-7.03	-4.32
	Market Compete		3.77	-0.55	0.92	1.51	3.18	5.40	3.43	6.07
	Hierarchy Control		6.14	5.58	7.17	5.58	5.33	5.20	6.39	3.36

Table 11. Data for active component perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve by sub-specialty

Population and view of Marine Forces Reserve culture		Active Component	Active Component 01XX N=45	Active Component 03XX N=19	Active Component 06XX N=18	Active Component 08XX N=19	Active Component 11/13XX N=16	Active Component 04/30XX N=18	Active Component 35XX N=10	Active Component 6XXX N=10
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	25.71	23.10	31.76	25.00	29.68	25.30	23.71	24.58	35.77
	Adhocracy Create	21.19	21.12	18.01	20.05	18.82	19.24	18.73	22.83	19.17
	Market Compete	25.09	30.90	19.51	27.85	22.96	30.00	27.94	25.80	19.78
	Hierarchy Control	28.01	24.87	30.73	26.06	28.54	25.46	29.62	26.78	25.28
Difference from Active Component Average	Clan Collaborative	N/A	2.61	-6.05	0.71	-3.97	0.41	2.00	1.13	-10.05
	Adhocracy Create		0.07	3.19	1.15	2.38	1.95	2.46	-1.64	2.03
	Market Compete		-5.82	5.58	-2.77	2.13	-4.91	-2.85	-0.71	5.30
	Hierarchy Control		3.14	-2.72	1.95	-0.53	2.55	-1.61	1.22	2.72

Table 12. Data for reservist perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve by sub-specialty

Population and view of Marine Forces Reserve culture		Reservists	Reservist 01XX N=28	Reservist 03XX N=49	Reservist 06XX N=73	Reservist 08XX N=30	Reservist 11/13XX N=52	Reservist 04/30XX N=41	Reservist 35XX N=44	Reservist 6XXX N=45
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	26.50	26.47	27.11	27.3	27.64	26.39	27.31	27.55	30.94
	Adhocracy Create	18.24	22.49	19.10	18.4	17.79	21.12	22.43	21.50	18.31
	Market Compete	28.30	25.51	29.26	30.3	29.45	27.45	23.82	26.46	23.13
	Hierarchy Control	26.95	25.53	24.62	24.1	24.98	25.04	26.43	24.49	27.62
Difference from Reservist Average	Clan Collaborative	N/A	0.03	-0.61	-0.76	-1.14	0.11	-0.81	-1.05	-4.44
	Adhocracy Create		-4.25	-0.85	-0.11	0.45	-2.88	-4.19	-3.26	-0.07
	Market Compete		2.79	-0.95	-2.01	-1.15	0.85	4.48	1.84	5.18
	Hierarchy Control		1.43	2.33	2.88	1.97	1.91	0.52	2.46	-0.67

Further analysis will focus on the cultural difference of 1) reservists integrating into active units, 2) active component members integrating into Marine Forces Reserve, 3) active component perspective over the duration their tour in Marine Forces Reserve, and 4) differing cultural opinions of reservists serving within Marine Forces Reserve.

B.   INTEGRATING RESERVISTS INTO THE ACTIVE FORCES

Reservists do not live in the same world as active component members. Analysis of reservists' perspectives may find benefit in considering some of the categories that naturally divide reservists; including region of service and status as an officer or enlisted member. Regionality is important as reservists can live in one region of the U.S. for the duration of their service and likely assume regional cultural characteristics in the process. Status as an enlisted or officer can influence an individual perspective due to scope of access and responsibility. Active component Marines' extended service in active units results in their responses considered as the basis defining active unit culture. Reservists' responses will likewise serve as the basis of Marine Forces Reserve's culture.

1.   Integration by Region

Research Question 2: Does a reservists' region of assignment impact reservists' view of active units?

Analysis using OCAI graphs as the basis of regionality shows little difference between Western reservists, Midwestern reservists, Southern reservists, Northeastern

reservists and active component members. The largest difference found is Midwestern reservists allocate 2.5% less of their survey's points toward *hierarchy*, which is shy of the 5% difference required for a significant difference. The OCAI graph provided in Figure 9 shows a near similar shape between the regions and active component members with the data in Table 13 verifying the insignificance of differences.

Figure 9.   OCAI graph of regional views of active units

Table 13.   Data for regional views of active units

Component		Active	Reservists			
Population and View		View of Active Units	Northeastern view of Active Units	Southern view of Active Units	Midwestern view of MFR	Western view of MFR
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	26.41	27.46	26.34	28.21	26.50
	Adhocracy Create	19.93	19.70	18.37	20.00	21.07
	Market Compete	27.85	27.18	29.12	28.34	26.38
	Hierarchy Control	25.81	25.64	25.35	23.32	25.43
Difference from Active Duty view of MFR	Clan Collaborative	N/A	-1.05	0.07	-1.80	-0.09
	Adhocracy Create		0.23	1.56	-0.08	-1.14
	Market Compete		0.67	-1.27	-0.49	1.48
	Hierarchy Control		0.16	0.46	2.49	0.38

OCAI analysis's insignificant findings guides the research to seek significant differences through varying dominance in cultural perspectives by dimension. Regionality has limited impact to the results of Section A. No change in cultural perspective was found in the following dimensions: *dominant characteristic*, *organizational leadership*, *management of employees*, and *criteria of success*. The remaining two dimensions resulted in a difference of opinion between the average composite of reservist and at least one region. In both cases, a secondary culture type assigned to the noted dimension matches the perspective of active component Marines' perspective of active units. A close secondary culture type is a culture type within one point by ratio to the dominant culture type. Where a close secondary culture type matches the primary culture type of another perspective, the likelihood of similar cultural perceptions between the two categories is highly probable.

a.   *Organizational Glue Dimension by Region of Reserve Service*

Three of the four studied regions share the view of all reservists and active component members, where active units are tied together through a sense of tradition and high levels of institutional loyalty *(clan)*. Midwestern reservists are the sole detractor from the norm finding active unit cohesion is found through seeking military dominance *(market)*. Midwestern reservists think active units are (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The

difference is likely to not cause any issue as active component members hold *clan* views as primary and *market* perspectives as secondary. Midwestern reservists hold *market* views as primary and *clan* perspectives as secondary. The sharing of primary and secondary culture types, albeit in reverse, should create a natural understanding of cultural perceptions and eliminate troubles associated with Midwestern reservists integrate into active units.

b.   *Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Region of Reserve Service*

Three of the four studied regions share the view of all reservists and active component members; where the long-term focus of active units is set on achieving organizational goals *(market)*. Western reservists believe the long-term focus of active units are to conduct well-planned, smooth-running operations *(hierarchy)*. This difference will likely be helpful to Midwestern reservists integrating into active units. Active component members and Midwestern reservists both believe active unit's *strategic emphasis* is focused on *market* and *hierarchy*. The difference between the two is active component members believe *market* tendencies hold primary sway and *hierarchy's* culture is secondary. Midwestern reservists find *hierarchy* tendencies primary and *market* as secondary. The sharing of primary and secondary culture types, albeit in reverse, should create a natural understanding of cultural perceptions and eliminate troubles associated with Midwestern reservists integrate into active units.

The summary of regionalizing reservists when compared to active component's perspective of active units is detailed in Table 14.

Table 14.   Regional views of active units by dimension

Reservists Perspective of Active Force by region or all	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Comp	MARKET	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY
All Reservists	CLAN	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN	MARKET	MARKET
Northeast	Clan	Market	Market (C)	Clan	Market (H)	Market (H)
South	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Market
Midwest	Clan	Market	Market	Market (C)	Market (C)	Market
West	Clan	Market	Market (C)	Clan	Hierarchy (M)	Market (H)

Reservists' perspectives of the culture of active units is similar to active component members 92% of the time. When these results are compared to the average found when comparing the averages of all reservists to active component, concurrence improves by 9%, showing reservists region of service positively impacts the integration of reservists into active forces. Comparison of active and reserve perspectives can be found in Table 15. Cells where reserve primary or secondary cultural perceptions do not match that of active members' primary or secondary cultural perceptions are shown shaded with diagonal black lines.

Table 15.   Comparison of opinions of active units by active component
members and reservists by region of service

Reservists Perspective of Active Force by region or all	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Comp	MARKET (C)	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN (M)	MARKET (H)	HIERARCHY
Northeast	Clan	Market	Market (C)	Clan	Market (H)	Market (H)
South	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Market
Midwest	Clan	Market	Market	Market (C)	Market (C)	
West	Clan	Market	Market (C)	Clan	Hierarchy (M)	Market (H)

2.   Integration by Status as an Officer or Enlisted Member

Research Question 3: Does status as an officer or enlisted member of either the active component or reserves impact perceptions of active unit culture?

Officers and enlisted members hold different roles and scopes of influence in the military. The difference of these roles likely shifts opinions about an organization's cultural norms according to an individual's status as an officer or enlisted member. Evaluation of how officers and enlisted members view active units showed active enlisted members, and reservists believe active units have stronger propensities to culturally lean toward family-orientation *(clan)* and creativity *(adhocracy)* than active component officers. Active component officers find active units to be more in line with results-orientation (*market)* by a 5.08-point margin of difference. The more than 5-point differential shows culture differences are to the level change can be found if desired. The resulting chart and data for this finding can be found in Figure 10 and Table 16.

Figure 10.   OCAI graph for officer and enlisted views of active units by component

Table 16.   Data for officer and enlisted views of active units by component

Type		Officers		Enlisted	
Component and View		Reservist view of Active Units	Active Component view of Active Units	Reservist view of Active Units	Active Component view of Active Units
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	27.99	23.89	26.75	26.99
	Adhocracy Create	17.89	15.77	20.15	19.96
	Market Compete	28.84	33.92	27.18	27.35
	Hierarchy Control	25.19	26.42	25.34	25.69
Difference in view of Active Units	Clan Collaborative	Difference for officers	4.10	Difference for enlisted	-0.24
	Adhocracy Create		2.11		0.19
	Market Compete		-5.08		-0.17
	Hierarchy Control		-1.22		-0.35

Although a difference was found in OCAI analysis by the four culture types, continuing analysis through the six dimensions may yield additional findings. This analysis will consider how officers and enlisted members differentiate from the average of their component and then determine if those differences have any impact in integration of reservists into active units. Evaluating opinions of active units by active component members and reservists according to their status as an officer or enlisted member has minimal impact in shifting opinions. Reservists' opinions shift in two of the 12 cases, with neither case significantly changing cultural perception. Active component perceptions shift in four of the 12 cases, also not impacting cultural perception significantly.

a.   *Dominant Characteristic Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted*

Active enlisted members find the *dominant characteristic* dimension of active units to be focused on Marines, possibly considered as a family-like atmosphere *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). This response is similar to how officer and enlisted members view active unit culture. The similarity speaks to reserve officers and enlisted members finding it easier to assimilate into active culture when interacting with active component enlisted members. Active component officers perceive the culture of active units similarly to how the combined averages of active officers and enlisted view active culture. Officers' responses

were significantly larger in the *market*, results-oriented, culture type in Table 16, which may have had a heavy influence in the average of active component responses.

b.   Organizational Leadership Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted

Reserve officers are the sole dissident from component averages in this dimension. They believe active unit leadership is culturally driven through mentoring *(clan, primary)* with a strong dose of demanding leadership *(market, secondary)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). *Market's* posture as a close secondary belief creates parity with the opinions of active component officers and active component enlisted members and should mitigate any complications associated with leadership expectations while integrating into active forces.

c.   Management of Employees Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted

Reservists, regardless of status as an officer or enlisted, and active component enlisted members continue to find active units manage Marines through actively driving Marines to success *(market)*. These findings are in concurrence with the general opinions of active component and reservists responses. Active officers diverge from the group and consider employee management in active units to be accomplished through secure employment and a regular work environment *(hierarchy, primary)* and driving leadership *(market, secondary)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Active component officer's perception of *market* type culture should make the integration of reservists into their world relatively seamless; however, active component officers run the Marine Corps and their opinions will have influence how employees are managed, including mobilized reservists. Reservists will need to adapt to learn active component officer's *hierarchy* tendencies.

d.   Organizational Glue Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted

This dimension finds a split between officers and enlisted members, regardless of component. Officers believe active units are held together by a drive for success *(market)*, while also finding loyalty and high commitment beneficial to organizational cohesion *(clan)*. Enlisted members of both components continue to find loyalty and enterprise commitment as paramount in creating unity of active units. Enlisted members are the

majority of those surveyed, which likely influences their component averages. These differences should have minimal effect in reservists' integration into the active forces, as they are standard across the enterprise and likely an institutional norm.

e. *Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted*

Active component officers, reservist officers, and reservist enlisted members all believe the emphasis of active units is to achieve long-term goals *(market)*. Active enlisted members concur with the belief of the other categories, but not to the level of the dominant characteristic. Active component enlisted members believe the primary driving characteristic of active unit strategic-driving force to be through efficient, well-planned operations and mission-accomplishment *(hierarchy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The status of *market* culture as the dominant culture for active officers, and reservists, and as a secondary culture for active enlisted should eliminate any troubles with understanding cultural perceptions of strategic focus when reservists integrate into active units.

f. *Criteria of Success Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted*

Status as an officer or enlisted member does not have any impact beyond those discussed in Section A. A summary of these findings is found in Table 17.

Table 17.   Officer and enlisted views of active units by component and dimension

Component Perspectives of Active Units by Status as Officer or Enlisted	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Officer & Enlisted	MARKET	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY
Reserve Officer & Enlisted	CLAN		MARKET	CLAN	MARKET	MARKET
Active Officer	Market	Market	Hierarchy (M)	Market (C)	Market	Hierarchy
Active Enlisted	Clan		Market (C)	Clan	Hierarchy (M)	
Reserve Officer	Clan	Clan (M)	Market	Market (C)	Market	Market
Reserve Enlisted		Market		Clan	Market	Market

Status as an officer or enlisted member had little to no impact upon the perspectives of active component and reservist Marines. When difference of opinion occurred, it was generally was accompanied by a close second culture matching the other three categories. Cultural norms were found close enough to cause any issue with reserve integration into active units. The sole point of difference was in active component officers' perspective of active unit's *Dominant Characteristic*. This difference should not be considered sufficient enough to cause cultural differences, as the remaining cultural perceptions match or near match the masses.

Status as an officer or enlisted member was found to have a positive impact upon reservists' integration into the culture of active forces; with cultural parity increasing from 83% to 96%. Active officer opinions of active units mirror that of reservists' opinions of active units, regardless of status as an officer or enlisted member, in all but two cases. Those differences lie in the *Dominant Characteristic*, which could be considered nullified due to concurrence in the remainder of the dimensions. Similar comparison of opinions through the perspective of active enlisted members shows one instance of non-concurrence among reserve officers in criteria of success. Reserve officers will need understand success may be judged differently when working with active enlisted members within active units. Overall, reservists culturally align with active officers 100% of the time, active enlisted 92% of the time, and active Marines in general 96%. Reservist comparisons of integration with active component enlisted and active component officers are shown in Tables 18 and Table 19. Cells where reserve primary or secondary cultural perceptions do not match active members' primary or secondary cultural perceptions are shown shaded with diagonal lines.

Table 18. Comparison of active unit opinions of active component officers and reservists

Reserve Officers and Enlisted Perspectives of Active Units compared to Active Officers	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Officer	MARKET	MARKET	HIERARCHY (M)	MARKET (C)	MARKET	HIERARCHY (M)
Reserve Officer	(Clan)	Clan (M)	Market	Market (C)	Market	Market
Reserve Enlisted	(Clan)	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Market (H)

Table 19. Comparison of active unit opinions of active component enlisted members and reservists

Reserve Officers and Enlisted Perspectives of Active Units compared to Active Enlisted	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Enlisted	CLAN	MARKET	MARKET (C)	CLAN	HIERARCHY (M)	HIERARCHY
Reserve Officer	Clan	Clan (M)	Market	Market (C)	Market	(Market)
Reserve Enlisted	Clan	Market	Market	Clan	Market	Market (H)

Cultural perspectives of active units are extremely close when comparing opinions of active component members and reservists. When the population of reservists was categorized into regions or status as an officer or enlisted the perceptions of active unit culture found consensus increased. Reservists by region agree on active unit culture in 92% of the dimensions studied. Reservists' perceptions of active units by status as an enlisted or officer agree with the perspective of active component members 96% of the time. Overall, reservists integrating into active units will have little issue immersing themselves into active unit culture.

C. INTEGRATION OF ACTIVE COMPONENT MARINES INTO MARINE FORCES RESERVE

Marine Forces Reserve relies upon active members to work with reservists to ensure its missions and tasks are completed in a professional manner. Experiences and cultural expectations of active and reserve components may be misaligned and can

complicate completion of these requirements. If there are any cultural gaps, two options are present for bridging them: 1) educating nearly 40,000 reservists in active component methods or 2) teaching 4,000 active component members how to work in Marine Forces Reserve. It is likely more efficient to educate a 4,000-person Inspector-Instructor cadre about the culture of the reserves than 40,000 reservists about how to properly interact with active component members. This section will use reservists' perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve as the basis of Marine Forces Reserve's culture. Reservists spend the majority of their career serving within Marine Forces Reserve, providing reservists with a deep understanding of Marine Forces Reserve.

The same variables noted in the previous section, regionality and status as an officer or enlisted member, may also play an integral role when active component members integrate into reservists' world through service within Marine Forces Reserve.

1.   Integration by Region

Research Question 4: Does assignment region impact the integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve?

Active component Marines and reservists by region were found to have similar views of the culture of Marine Forces Reserve. Reservists' responses were shown to vary slightly from active component responses, but never by more than five or more points signifying significance. Figure 11 displays the parity of opinions of Marine Forces Reserve's culture between active component members and reservists by region of service. Table 20 provides the supporting data for Figure 11.

Figure 11.   OCAI graph of regional views of Marine Forces Reserve

Table 20.   Data for regional views of Marine Forces Reserve

Component		Active	Reservists			
Population and View		Active Component view of Marine Forces Reserve	Northeastern reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve	Southern reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve	Midwestern reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve	Western reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	26.36	28.12	26.77	30.43	28.14
	Adhocracy Create	20.08	19.12	19.24	20.68	20.86
	Market Compete	26.34	26.57	28.26	25.58	25.82
	Hierarchy Control	27.14	26.18	25.70	23.42	25.19
Difference from Active Duty view of MFR	Clan Collaborative	N/A	-1.76	-0.41	-4.07	-1.78
	Adhocracy Create		0.96	0.85	-0.60	-0.78
	Market Compete		-0.23	-1.92	0.76	0.52
	Hierarchy Control		0.96	1.44	3.72	1.95

The limited insights gained from OCAI analysis was improved when analysis shifted to dimensions as the primary comparative framework. Reserve opinions shifted in

51

29% of the dimensions studied. The improved accuracy of reservist's perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve had a negative impact toward cultural concurrence between active component and reservists.

a.   Dominant Characteristic of All Dimensions by Region of Reserve Service

The perception of what characteristic maintains dominance had only one transition when reservists' opinions were viewed by region of service. Active component members, the average of all reservists, Northeastern reservists, Midwestern reservists, and Western reservists continue to the culture of Marine Forces Reserve is dominated by care and focus on its Marines *(clan)*. Southern reservists believe Marine Forces Reserve is culturally propensed toward results-orientation *(market)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The difference in *dominant characteristic* by itself should not be considered sufficient enough to merit concern when active component members integrate into Marine Forces Reserve. Care should be taken to consider the other five traits in conjunction with the difference found to be dominant.

b.   Organizational Leadership Dimension by Region of Reserve Service

The perception of which culture type governs *leadership* is split into two distinct camps. Active component members, all reservists, Northeastern reservists, and Southern reservists believe the leadership of Marine Forces Reserve are culturally more likely to be demanding of those within their organization *(market)*. Midwestern and Western reservists believe Marine Forces Reserve's leadership is propensed to culturally focus on mentoring and guiding those in their organization *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The differing of opinions between active component members and Midwestern or Western reservists may lead to some difficulty when active component members serve within the reserves.

c.   Management of Employees and Organizational Glue Dimensions by Region of Reserve Service

A change in perspective of cultural propensities of Marine Forces Reserve's focus in *management of employees* and *organizational glue* dimensions does not occur when

reservists' opinions are considered by region of service. Results in these dimensions will carry over from Section A.

d.   Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Region of Reserve Service

Reservists according to region of service believe a variety of cultural inclinations drive the strategic focus of Marine Forces Reserve. Three of the four culture types are held as the dominant culture and two of those three are considered secondary. Active component members, all reservists, and Western reservists believe Marine Forces Reserve strives for efficient, well-planned operations *(hierarchy)*. This trait is considered a close secondary trait for Northeastern and Southern reservists. Northeastern and Midwestern reservists believe Marine Forces Reserve accomplishes its strategic goals through investment in human capital *(clan)*. Southern reservists consider Marine Forces Reserve to be strategically focused on long-term goal achievement *(market)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Active component members serving in the northeast, south, and west should find themselves comfortable with the perceived strategic cultural perspective of Marine Forces Reserve held by reservists serving in those regions. Active component members serving in the Midwest have trouble with the strategic focus of the region's reservists.

e.   Criteria of Success Dimension by Region of Reserve Service

This dimension finds consensus between the active component Marines and reservists, regardless of region; with Western reservists concurring through their close second culture type. The dominant characteristic driving Marine Forces Reserve's success according to active component members, Northeastern reservists, Southern reservists, and Midwestern reservists is fiscally responsible, well-planned operations *(hierarchy)*. Western reservists believe success within Marine Forces Reserve's is found by concern for both their customers and Marines *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The difference of opinions between Western reservists and active component members may cause some cultural dissonance. Active component members will need to realize their perceptions are important to Western reservists, but not to the level of concern for the area's Marines.

The differences between the perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve according to all reservists, reservists by region, active component members are shown in Table 21.

Table 21.   Regional views of Marine Forces Reserve by Dimension

Type of Characteristic	Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Strongest Characteristic	Active Comp	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
	All	CLAN	MARKET	CLAN	CLAN	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
	Northeast	Clan	Market	Clan	Clan	Clan (H)	Hierarchy
	South	Market	Market	Clan (M)	Clan (M)	Market (H)	Hierarchy
	Midwest	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy
	West	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan (M)	Hierarchy (C)	Clan (H)

Regionality will negatively impact the integration of active members into Marine Forces Reserve by an average of 17%. Active Component members do not concur with the entire cultural perspective of any region studied. Active members' cultural perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve concur with Northeastern reservists 67% of the time, Southern reservists 50% of the time, Midwestern reservists 33% of the time, and Western reservists 50% of the time. Overall, active component concurrence with reservists by region of service occurs in 50% of the dimensions studied. Region of service is likely to have a significant impact upon integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve. Regionality's impact upon the integration of active component integration is shown in Table 22. Cells where reserve primary or secondary cultural perceptions do not match active members' primary or secondary cultural perceptions are shown shaded with diagonal lines.

Table 22.   Comparison of opinions of Marine Forces by active component members and reservists by region of service

Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve Matching Active Component Responses	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Component	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY (M)	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
Northeast	Clan	Market	Clan	Clan	Clan (H)	Hierarchy
South	Clan	Market	Clan (H)	Clan (H)	Market (H)	Hierarchy
Midwest	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy
West	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan (H)	Hierarchy (C)	Clan (H)

2.   Integration by Status as an Officer or Enlisted Member

Research Question 5: Does status as an officer or enlisted member of either the active component or reserves impact perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve's culture?

Active component enlisted members and reservists regardless of status as an officer or enlisted member have a similar view of Marine Forces Reserve's culture. Enlisted members should have little trouble integrating into the perceived culture of Marine Forces Reserve as seen by reservists enlisted and officers. Active component officers may have a more troublesome experience as the active component officer opinion of Marine Forces Reserve's culture deviates at a significant level. Active component officers believe Marine Forces Reserve's culture to be less propensed toward creativity *(adhocracy)*, with the focus instead shifted toward culture driven by rules, hierarchy, and bureaucracy *(hierarchy)*. The OCAI chart for this section and its supporting data is found in Figure 12 and Table 23.

Figure 12.　OCAI graph for officer and enlisted views of Marine Forces
Reserve by component

Table 23.　Data for officer and enlisted views of Marine Forces Reserve by
component

Component		Officers		Enlisted	
Population and View		Reservist view of MFR	Active Component view of MFR	Reservist view of MFR	Active Component view of MFR
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	29.37	28.56	26.90	27.93
	Adhocracy Create	19.26	15.95	20.12	20.13
	Market Compete	25.55	23.82	25.67	26.46
	Hierarchy Control	25.81	31.67	27.21	25.49
Difference in view of MFR	Clan Collaborative	Difference for officers	0.81	Difference for enlisted	-1.03
	Adhocracy Create		3.31		-0.01
	Market Compete		1.73		-0.79
	Hierarchy Control		-5.86		1.72

The significance of hierarchical perspectives found during OCAI analysis continues when analysis continues via dimension. The additional specificity dimensions offer reduce concurrence of cultural perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve from 67% to

63%. This is notably an improvement over cultural comparison by regions, which resulted in 50% concurrence. Level of concurrence varies between active component members and reservists dependent upon their status as an officer or enlisted member.

a. *Dominant Characteristic, Management of Employees, and Organizational Glue Dimensions by Status as an Officer or Enlisted*

There is no change in perspective of Marine Forces Reserve by reservists, regardless of status as an enlisted or officer member in the perceptions of *dominant characteristic*, *management of employees*, and *organizational glue*. The analysis of these dimensions will mirror those found in Section A.

b. *Organizational Leadership Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted*

Reservist enlisted, active component officers, and active component enlisted find Marine Forces Reserve's leadership to be culturally demanding *(market)*. Reserve offices belief Marine Forces Reserve's leadership strives to mentor those entrusted into their care *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Marine Forces Reserve is a unique organization where leadership can be active component or reserve officers throughout the hierarchy. Interactions between officers at all levels may lead to some cognitive dissonance as to how they believe the leadership of Marine Forces is focused. Officers will need be prepared to learn a different perspective when interacting with an officer of a different component.

c. *Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Status as an Officer or Enlisted*

Active component officers, active component enlisted members, and reserve enlisted believe Marine Forces Reserve culturally focuses on well-planned, smooth-running operations *(hierarchy)* as its central strategy. Reserve officers believe the focus is through investment in human capital *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). This difference should have minimal impact as reserve officers also believe well-planned, smooth-running operations *(hierarchy)* are extremely important, albeit of secondary importance to human capital *(clan)*. There will likely be little issue with active component members integrating into Marine Forces Reserve as a function of perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *strategic emphasis*.

The perspective of what culturally drives success within Marine Forces Reserve is split between the *clan* and *hierarchy* culture types. Reserve officers and active component enlisted find Marine Forces Reserve's success is culturally found through low cost, dependable operations *(hierarchy)*. Active component officers and reservist enlisted members believe it to be based in focus on people as the mission *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The split means active officers will have an easier time understanding how reservist enlisted members perceive success and active enlisted members will similarly understand reservist officers. Table 24 summarizes the findings of how status as an officer or enlisted member impact cultural perceptions.

Table 24.   Officer and enlisted views of Marine Forces Reserve by component and dimension

Component Perspectives of Active Units by Status as Officer or Enlisted	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Active Officer & Enlisted	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY (M)	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
Reserve Officer & Enlisted			CLAN	CLAN		
Active Officer	Clan	Market	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Clan
Active Enlisted						Hierarchy
Reserve Officer	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan (H)	Hierarchy (C)
Reserve Enlisted		Market (C)			Hierarchy (C)	Clan (H)

Opinions of Marine Forces Reserve's cultural propensities according to active component and reservists were minimally impacted by status as an officer or enlisted member. A shift in opinion only occurred in four of the 24 combinations of category and dimension measured. Of those four variations, only one is likely to lead to significant issues with active integration into Marine Forces Reserve: active officers and reserve officers disagree upon the cultural norms driving the leadership of Marine Forces Reserve

Status as an officer or enlisted member was found to have a varying level of negative impact in the difference between active component members and reservists cultural outlooks of Marine Forces Reserve. Interaction with reserve officers by active

component officers finds concurrence in the cultural views in 50% of the dimensions studied; with matching occurring 67% of the time for active component enlisted. Interaction with reserve enlisted by active component officers and enlisted shows concurrence 100% of the time with concurrence in cultural opinions of Marine Forces Reserve 67% of the time.

Overall, the perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's culture when viewed through the visage of status as an officer or enlisted member shows concurrence between the active and reserve components in 63% of the dimensions and categories considered. Status as an officer or enlisted will likely negatively impact the integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve. The effect of status as an officer or enlisted member upon the integration of active component integration into Marine Forces Reserve is shown in Table 25 and Table 26. Cells where reserve primary or secondary cultural perceptions do not match that of active members' primary or secondary cultural perceptions are shown shaded with diagonal lines.

Table 25.   Comparison of Marine Forces Reserve opinions of reservist officers and active component members

Active Officer and Enlisted Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve matching Reserve Officers	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Reserve Officer	CLAN	CLAN	CLAN	CLAN	CLAN (H)	HIERARCHY (C)
Active Officer	Clan	Market	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Clan
Active Enlisted	Clan	Market (C)	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy

Table 26.   Comparison of Marine Forces Reserve Opinions of reservist enlisted members and active component members

Active Officer and Enlisted Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve matching Reserve Enlisted	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
Reserve Enlisted	CLAN	MARKET (C)	CLAN	CLAN	HIERARCHY (C)	CLAN (H)
Active Officer	Clan	Market	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Clan
Active Enlisted	Clan	Market (C)	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy	Hierarchy

Regionality and status as an officer or enlisted member were found to have a negative impact during the integration of active component Marines into Marine Forces Reserve. The study regionality resulted in cultural concurrence of 50% and status as an officer or enlisted yielded concurrence of 63%. Active component members will likely experience some form of cultural dissonance when serving within Marine Forces Reserve.

D.   EVOLVING ACTIVE COMPONENT PERSPECTIVE OVER TIME

When participants find themselves involved in a new culture progress toward familiarity evolves over time. Active component Marines serving with Marine Forces Reserve experience a similar evolution of familiarity during their tour. The maturation process here is defined through comparisons between the first 18 months of service within Marine Forces Reserve, perceived as a period of culture shock, followed by normalization afterwards. Results will be provided in six graphs, with each explaining the progression of active component Marines perceptions of a particular facet of Marine Forces Reserve.

This section will explain how dimensions evolve over time, using the ratios created by the OCAI survey and explained in Chapter III, Section B. The ratios will show how Marine Forces Reserve is a continuously changing mixture of family-orientation *(clan)*, creativity *(adhocracy)*, results-driven *(market)*, and bureaucratic *(adhocracy)* tendencies.

> **Research Question 6:** Does active component perspective on Marine Forces Reserve's culture evolve toward reservists' perspective during their tour as a member of an Inspector-Instructor staff?

1. **Dominant Characteristic of All Dimensions by Time in Marine Forces Reserve**

Active component members begin their tour with Marine Forces Reserve believing the organization divided; with 29.6% of the focus on creating a structured workplace *(hierarchy)*, 29.3% toward a family-like workplace *(clan)*, 23.8% an organization driven by results orientation *(market)*, and 17.5% a creative, risk-taking organization *(adhocracy)*. Between six and twelve months of service within Marine Forces Reserve, active component members believe less in Marine Forces Reserve as organizations focused toward family-orientation *(clan)* and procedurally driven *(hierarchy)* with the ratio losses offered toward results-orientation *(market)* and creativity *(adhocracy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). At this point, the ratio offered to *market*, *clan*, and *hierarchy* culture types is near equivalent with less than 20% of the ratio offered to *adhocracy*.

The next six months see the perspective of active members evolve significantly toward that of reservists' view of Marine Forces Reserve. Nearly 8% of the ratio assigned to the cultural perspective in policy and procedure *(hierarchy)* are reallocated toward competitive nature (*market*, gaining 1.7% up to 28.7%) and a friendly place to work (*clan*, gaining 6%, up to 32.2%). No change occurs in the ratio of creativity *(adhocracy)*.

The final period studied encompasses all active component members with more than 18 months of service in Marine Forces Reserve. This period sees a drop in cultural perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve as a competitive workplace (*Market*, -3%, settling at 25.7%), creative environment (*adhocracy*, -1.6%, settling at 18%), and family-orientation (*clan*, -1.4%, settling at 30.8%). The lost percentages settle in the *hierarchy*, bureaucratic culture type with a 6% increase, settling at 25.5% of the total.

Figure 13 shows the evolution of the ratio attributed to each culture type among the dominant characteristic dimension. The color of area represents one of the four cultures: yellow represents *clan*, green represents *adhocracy*, blue represents *market*, and red represents *hierarchy*. The totality of the four culture types adds to 100 and shows the ratio's evolution over time. Figure 14 provides the same information via OCAI charts with the active component perspective shown in bright green and the reservist perspective shown in dark green. Table 27 provides the data surrounding Figure 14. Data in the third to sixth

columns reflects the difference in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve when comparing reservists with more than 18 months service and active component members with varying amounts of service within Marine Forces Reserve.

Figure 13.   Shifting perspective on *Dominant Characteristic* of all dimensions

Figure 14.   OCAI charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of
Marine Forces Reserve's *Dominant Characteristic*

Table 27.   Data for the charts of the evolution of active component's
perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Dominant Characteristic*

View of Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists with 18+ months of service	Difference between Reservists' perspective by category			
		Active component with 1-6 months of service	Active component with 6-12 months of service	Active component with 12-18 months of service	Active component with 18+ months of service
Clan Collaborate	27.82	1.45	-1.63	4.38	2.96
Adhocracy Create	21.55	-4.06	-1.95	-1.94	-3.52
Market Compete	27.05	-3.25	-0.08	1.65	-1.33
Hierarchy Control	23.58	5.98	3.66	-4.10	1.89

2.   Organizational Leadership Dimension by Time in Marine Forces Reserve

Leadership typology evolves in the military by nature of how of the personnel turnover process which occurs regularly among active component officers, active component enlisted members, and reservist officers. Only reservist enlisted members are permitted a continual presence in a unit for up to 30 years; and that feat requires one location to rate a specialty from Private (E1) to the senior enlisted rank of Master Gunnery Sergeant (E9). Active component members in the first six months of a tour with Marine Forces Reserve find the organization's leadership tendencies to be a combination of mentorship (*clan*, 26.5%), hard-driving (*market*, 25.9), risk takers who are willing to innovate (*adhocracy*, 25.5%), and planners by nature (*hierarchy*, 22.1%) (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The ratio assigned to *hierarchy* remains at 22.1% through the first 18 months of service within Marine Forces Reserve. Any shifts occurring within ratios, solely happens within the other three culture types.

Active Component cultural beliefs shift minimally between 6–12 months of service within Marine Forces Reserve. Mentoring and driving leadership receive additional portions of the ratio; with *clan* gaining 0.8%, maintaining seniority and settling at 27.2% and *market* gaining 1.2%, settling at 27.1%. These gains within mentoring and hard driving

leadership come at the cost of leadership driven by innovation. *Adhocracy* leadership loses 2% of its ratio and rests at 23.5% at the end of the average active component member's first year of service within Marine Forces Reserve.

Another slight shift in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve as active component members near the 18-month mark of service. This period finds a reversal of the trend experienced during the 6- to 12-month period. The gains found in mentoring and hard driving leadership typologies are lost; with *clan* losing 1.9%, resulting in 25.3% and *market* losing 0.9% to settle at 26.2%. The entirety of losses shifted toward the belief that Marine Forces Reserve's leadership is innovative *(adhocracy),* resulting in a 2.9% gain to settle at 27.4%. This period reflects the first time that the ratio does not have mentoring leadership as the perceived dominant culture type in Marine Forces Reserve.

The final iteration of active component members' perspective of Marine Forces Reserve resulted in another reversal and change within the *hierarchy* ratio. The gains and more found in the 12 to 18-month period in innovative leadership *(adhocracy)* were lost. Adhocracy lost 6.5% of its ratio, settling as the culture type with least ratio remaining at 20.9%. Bureaucratic leadership *(hierarchy)* experienced its first shift of the period studied, albeit at a minimal amount with a 0.1% gain to settle at 22.2%. Leadership's focus toward mentoring *(clan)* increased by 1.3% to settle at 26.6%. *Market*'s hard driving leadership experienced the greatest increase of 4.1% and settled to 30.3%.

This final shift saw *market* account for nearly 1/3 of the leadership tendencies of Marine Forces Reserve according to active component members. This is not in line with Reservists who view Marine Forces Reserve's leadership to be driven by mentoring *(clan)*, with driving leadership *(market)* as a close second.

Figure 15 shows the evolution of the ratio attributed to each culture type among the dominant characteristic dimension. The color of area represents one of the four cultures: yellow represents *clan*, green represents *adhocracy*, blue represents *market*, and red represents *hierarchy.* The totality of the four culture types adds to 100 and shows the ratio's evolution over time. Figure 16 provides the same information via OCAI charts with the active component perspective shown in bright green and the reservist perspective shown

in dark green. Table 28 provides the data surrounding Figure 16. Data in the third to sixth columns reflects the difference in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve when comparing reservists with more than 18 months service and active component members with varying amounts of service within Marine Forces Reserve.


Organizational Leadership
Active Component changes in view of Marine Forces Reserve over time

	0-6 Months	6-12 months	12-18 months	18+ Months
Hierarchy	22.1	22.1	21.1	22.2
Market	25.9	27.1	26.2	30.3
Adhocracy	25.5	23.5	27.4	20.9
Clan	26.4	27.2	25.3	26.6

Months of Service in Marine Forces Reserve

■ Clan   ■ Adhocracy   ■ Market   ■ Hierarchy

Figure 15.   Shifting perspective on *Organizational Leadership* dimension

Figure 16.   OCAI charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of
Marine Forces Reserve's *Organizational Leadership*

Table 28.　Data for the charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Organizational Leadership*

View of Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists with 18+ months of service	Difference between Reservists' perspective by category			
		Active component with 1-6 months of service	Active component with 6-12 months of service	Active component with 12-18 months of service	Active component with 18+ months of service
Clan Collaborate	26.62	-0.18	0.57	-1.31	0.02
Adhocracy Create	23.08	2.41	0.46	4.33	-2.14
Market Compete	26.12	-0.23	1.01	0.08	4.14
Hierarchy Control	24.04	-1.97	-1.91	-2.97	-1.88

3. Management of Employees Dimension by Time in Marine Forces Reserve

Active component perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve's cultural propensities in *management of employees* fail to match reservists' opinions at any point during their evolution. Initial active component view of Marine Forces Reserve's *management of employees* offers management is teamwork focused environment (*clan,* 27.5%), providing a predictable environment (*hierarchy,* 25%), often times driving employees toward success (*market*, 24.7%), with a small focus on encouraging creativity through freedom of action (*adhocracy*, 22.8%) (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

After six months, the following culture types lose some of their perceived influence in Marine Force Reserve's culture: teamwork focus *(clan)* drops by 1.5% to 26%, encouragement of creativity *(adhocracy)* falls by 3.5%, and *management of employees* through competitiveness is reduced by 0.2%. The losses experienced by the other three culture types are offered toward providing stability *(hierarchy)*; which assumes the mantle as owning the largest portion of the ratio at 30.1%. Hierarchy continues to maintain this lead throughout the remainder of time periods studied.

Shifts in cultural perceptions continue to occur as active component members pass their first year of service within Marine Forces Reserve. Management through stability

(*hierarchy*) increases by another 2.6%. Cultural focus toward creativity (*adhocracy*) rebound from the lost ratio in the first period, regaining 2.6% of the lost 3.5%, settling at 21.9% of the ratio. Teamwork *(clan)* finds a small resurgence in active component opinions of Marine Forces Reserve gaining 0.2% to total 26.2%. The gains found in the other three culture types are found through the losses in management by driving employees (*market, loses* 5.3%); which rests at 19.2% during this period.

Evolution of active component views of Marine Forces Reserve's employee management continues through the final period evaluated. The strongest culture type continues to be *hierarchy*, with a focus on management through stability. *Hierarchy* closes at 32% with a slight loss of 0.7% from observations in the 12- to 18-month period. The nearly 1/3 of the ratio being assigned to this culture type speaks to its power in the perceived culture of Marine Forces Reserve. Teamwork-based management (*clan)* loses 3% and settles at 23.2%. Management through innovation and individual freedom *(adhocracy)* loses 2.9% to settle at 19%. The losses in *clan, adhocracy,* and *hierarchy* are redistributed to management by focus on results orientation *(market)*; which gains 6.7% to settle the final period evaluated at 25.9%. These results do not settle in a way similar to reservists' views of Marine Forces Reserve's culture. Reservists rank Marine Forces Reserve's *management of employees* by ratio their perspective as *clan, market, hierarchy,* and *adhocracy.* Reservists find the responses much more tightly bound with all four ratios settling between 22% and 28%.

Figure 17 shows the evolution of the ratio attributed to each culture type among the dominant characteristic dimension. The color of area represents one of the four cultures: yellow represents *clan*, green represents *adhocracy*, blue represents *market*, and red represents *hierarchy.* The totality of the four culture types adds to 100 and shows the ratio's evolution over time. Figure 18 provides the same information via OCAI charts with the active component perspective shown in bright green and the reservist perspective shown in dark green. Table 29 provides the data surrounding Figure 18. Data in the third to sixth columns reflects the difference in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve when comparing reservists with more than 18 months service and active component members with varying amounts of service within Marine Forces Reserve.

Management of Employees
Active Component changes in view of Marine Forces Reserve over time

	0-6 Months	6-12 months	12-18 months	18+ Months
Hierarchy	25.0	30.1	32.7	32.0
Market	24.7	24.5	19.2	25.9
Adhocracy	22.8	19.3	21.9	19.0
Clan	27.5	26.0	26.2	23.2

Months of Service in Marine Forces Reserve

■ Clan ■ Adhocracy ■ Market ■ Hierarchy

Figure 17.   Shifting perspective on *Management of Employees* dimension

Figure 18. OCAI charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Management of Employees*

Table 29.   Data for the charts of the evolution of active component's
perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Management of Employees*

View of Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists with 18+ months of service	Difference between Reservists' perspective by category			
		Active component with 1-6 months of service	Active component with 6-12 months of service	Active component with 12-18 months of service	Active component with 18+ months of service
Clan Collaborate	28.00	-0.45	-2.02	-1.82	-4.84
Adhocracy Create	21.53	1.31	-2.20	0.36	-2.55
Market Compete	26.53	-1.87	-1.98	-7.30	-0.67
Hierarchy Control	23.71	1.24	6.43	9.00	8.29

4.   Organizational Glue Dimension by Time in Marine Forces Reserve

Active component member's views of Marine Forces Reserve's *organizational glue* shift multiple times over the four periods observed. Initial ratios during the first six months of active component service in Marine Forces Reserve show the central tenets to be 29.2% tradition-bound with high commitment *(clan)*, 25.6% through statutes, policies and procedures *(adhocracy)*, 22.7% via focus on accomplishing goals *(market)*, and 20.4% through drive to be on the cutting edge of change *(adhocracy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

Perspective shifts at the next step (6-12 months of service) to where *clan* and *adhocracy* lose some of their ratio to the benefit of *market* and *hierarchy.* The focus on commitment and history *(clan)* drops by 4.1% to settle at 25.1%. A focus on the need to be cutting-edge similarly experiences a dwindling in ratio from 20.4% to 19.2% with a 1.2% loss. The losses were redistributed to the glue created by statues, policies, and rules *(hierarchy)* and a focus toward success *(market)*. *Hierarchy* gained 1.5% to settle at 24.2% and *market* gained 5.5% to settle at 31.5% by ratio.

Entry into the first year through 18 months of service within Marine Forces Reserve further shuffled *organizational glue*'s ratio according to active component members. *Market*, success focused, cohesion continues to gain, picking up another 4.4% to settle at

28.8%. The *adhocracy* culture type picks up 1.5% of the total ratio; surpassing the original setting by 0.3% at 20.7%. *Hierarchy's* glue through statues, policies, rules loses some ground dropping from 31.5% by 3.2% to settle at 28.3%. The final culture type, Clan, continues a downward trend by losing 2.9% to a new low of 22.2% of the total ratio.

The last period studied shows continued shuffling of the ratio with the settling of active component members' views disparate to views held by reservists. Success-focused organizational glue *(hierarchy)* continues its trend of upward grown ending up at 30.8% after beginning at 22.7% in the beginning of this section. *Hierarchy's* cohesion through statues, rules and policies finds an extremely minimal growth from 28.3% to 28.4%. Solidity through commitment and tradition increases by 1.5% to settle at 23.7%. All the gains in the final section are due to the losses experienced in *adhocracy's* focus on cutting-edge innovation. *Adhocracy* drops by another 3.6% to settle at 17.1%. Up to this point, all four culture types have shown *adhocracy* to end as the least powerful culture type by ratio, with this observation given the smallest portion thereof. The reserve perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's Organizational Glue settles with *clan* in the lead, followed by *market* and *adhocracy*, all between 28% and 26% with *adhocracy* falling significantly below, just shy of 20%.

Figure 19 shows the evolution of the ratio attributed to each culture type among the dominant characteristic dimension. The color of area represents one of the four cultures: yellow represents *clan*, green represents *adhocracy*, blue represents *market*, and red represents *hierarchy*. The totality of the four culture types adds to 100 and shows the ratio's evolution over time. Figure 20 provides the same information via OCAI charts with the active component perspective shown in bright green and the reservist perspective shown in dark green. Table 30 provides the data surrounding Figure 20. Data in the third to sixth columns reflects the difference in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve when comparing reservists with more than 18 months service and active component members with varying amounts of service within Marine Forces Reserve.

Organizational Glue
Active Component changes in view of Marine Forces Reserve over time

	0-6 Months	6-12 months	12-18 months	18+ Months
Hierarchy	25.6	31.5	28.3	28.4
Market	22.7	24.2	28.8	30.8
Adhocracy	20.4	19.2	20.7	17.1
Clan	29.2	25.1	22.2	23.7

Months of Service in Marine Forces Reserve

■ Clan ■ Adhocracy ■ Market ■ Hierarchy

Figure 19.   Shifting perspective on *Organizational Glue* dimension

Figure 20.　OCAI charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Organizational Glue*

Table 30.   Data for the charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Organizational Glue*

View of Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists with 18+ months of service	Difference between Reservists' perspective by category			
		Active component with 1-6 months of service	Active component with 6-12 months of service	Active component with 12-18 months of service	Active component with 18+ months of service
Clan Collaborate	27.99	1.18	-2.85	-5.75	-4.29
Adhocracy Create	19.54	0.82	-0.37	1.13	-2.44
Market Compete	26.46	-3.80	-2.30	2.29	4.32
Hierarchy Control	26.08	-0.50	5.45	2.26	2.34

5.   Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Time in Marine Forces Reserve

Active component members experience a significant shift of their opinions of Marine Forces Reserve's *strategic emphasis* over their tour, eventually mirroring the perception of reservists strongest to weakest culture types; albeit not exactly by ratio distribution. During their first 12 months, active component members believe the overarching goals of Marine Forces Reserve are 29% attributable to smooth, stable operations *(hierarchy)*, 24.7% through commitment to organizational goals *(market)*, 24.3% via investment in human capital *(clan)*, and 22% through a focus on change *(adhocracy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011).

Opinions of Marine Forces Reserve by active component members shift when they complete between 6 to 12 months of service in Marine Forces Reserve. Emphasis in smooth operations *(hierarchy)* and focus on goal accomplishment *(market)* decrease by a combined 5.6%. The lost ratio is redistributed; with 2.6% shifted to emphasis on using creativity to tackle market challenges and the other 3.1% transitioning to a focused effort on human capital improvement. Ratios in this period settle as follows: *clan* at 27.4%, *hierarchy* at 26.5%, *adhocracy* at 24.6%, and *market* at 21.6%.

The third period, service between 12 and 18 months within Marine Forces Reserve, continues to experience drastic swings across the four culture types. *Market's* focus on goal achievement gains back 6.5% to settle at 28.1% and *hierarchy's* emphasis on well-run operations gains 1.4% to land at 27.9%. The gains in these two culture types came at a cost to *adhocracy* and *clan*. *Adhocracy* lost 1% showing the emphasis on resource acquisition lost some of its importance. *Clan's* focus on improvement through human resource investment lost 7% to 20.4%.

The final period saw minimal shifts within two of the culture types and a heavy transition of ratio between the other two. The focus on achievement through achieving organizational goals *(market)* continued to hold the strongest portion of the ratio, albeit by only one point by settling at 28.9%. Market gained 0.8%. The emphasis on well-run operations *(hierarchy)* experienced no change and remained at 27.9%. Emphasis on human capital growth as an organizational path toward success gained 4.1% to settle on 24.5%. Adhocracy's acquisitional mindset lost 4.9% to 18.7%.

The final resting point of these four culture types found equivalency in standing by ratio in the following order: 1) *market*, 2) *hierarchy*, 3) *clan*, and 4) *adhocracy*. Reservists held the first two in higher regard by ratio than active forces. The third, *clan*, was offered slightly less of a ratio and the fourth, *adhocracy*, was offered nearly 5% less by ratio. The parity with ordering should show cultural perceptions are near similarities and prove strategic emphasis evolves to a point where there should not be any cultural confusion when active members consider the perspective of *strategic emphasis* for members of Marine Forces Reserve.

Figure 21 shows the evolution of the ratio attributed to each culture type among the dominant characteristic dimension. The color of area represents one of the four cultures: yellow represents *clan*, green represents *adhocracy*, blue represents *market*, and red represents *hierarchy*. The totality of the four culture types adds to 100 and shows the ratio's evolution over time. Figure 22 provides the same information via OCAI charts with the active component perspective shown in bright green and the reservist perspective shown in dark green. Table 31 provides the data surrounding Figure 22. Data in the third to sixth columns reflects the difference in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve when comparing

reservists with more than 18 months service and active component members with varying amounts of service within Marine Forces Reserve.


Figure 21.   Shifting perspective on *Strategic Emphasis* dimension

Figure 22.   OCAI charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of
Marine Forces Reserve's *Strategic Emphasis*

Table 31.   Data for the charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Strategic Emphasis*

View of Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists with 18+ months of service	Difference between Reservists' perspective by category			
		Active component with 1-6 months of service	Active component with 6-12 months of service	Active component with 12-18 months of service	Active component with 18+ months of service
Clan Collaborate	25.34	-1.01	2.04	4.97	-0.81
Adhocracy Create	22.77	-0.77	1.80	0.80	-4.10
Market Compete	26.07	-1.40	-4.49	2.04	2.85
Hierarchy Control	25.99	3.01	0.47	1.96	1.89

6.   Criteria of Success Dimension by Time in Marine Forces Reserve

This is by far the most stable of dimensions throughout the evolution of active component member's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve. Furthermore, this is the sole dimension where change in perspective is nearly non-existent and change in perspective does not occur after the first period. The sole change that occurs after the first period is the ratios assigned to each of the four culture types. Active component member's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's cultures in first six months of service reflects the following: 28.4% defined by focus on personnel *(clan),* 29.7% through well-planned, fiscally conservative operations *(hierarchy),* 23.9% via military domination *(market)*, and unique delivery *(adhocracy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011)*.*

Entry into the second period finds ratio redistributed from unique delivery *(adhocracy)* to well-planned, fiscally conservative operations *(hierarchy).* The transition of ratio results in ordering of the culture types by dominance in the ratio to: 1) *hierarchy*, 2) *clan*, 3) *market*, and 4) *adhocracy*. The ordering holds steady throughout the remaining two periods with the ratios of the more dominant three resting between 28.4% and 27%. *Adhocracy's* unique delivery eventually loses much of its purchase among the other three and rests at 17.2%. Reservists' opinion of the ordering of the four culture types follows the same order with variance in each culture type's ratio at most 2%. The extreme similarities

between the active component and reservist's opinions of Marine Forces Reserve's *criteria of success* should yield an ease in cultural assimilation between active and reserve members.

Figure 23 shows the evolution of the ratio attributed to each culture type among the dominant characteristic dimension. The color of area represents one of the four cultures: yellow represents *clan*, green represents *adhocracy*, blue represents *market*, and red represents *hierarchy*. The totality of the four culture types adds to 100 and shows the ratio's evolution over time. Figure 24 provides the same information via OCAI charts with the active component perspective shown in bright green and the reservist perspective shown in dark green. Table 32 provides the data surrounding Figure 24. Data in the third to sixth columns reflects the difference in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve when comparing reservists with more than 18 months of service and active component members with varying amounts of service within Marine Forces Reserve.


Figure 23.   Shifting perspective on *Criteria of Success* dimension

Figure 24.   OCAI charts of the evolution of active component's perspective of
Marine Forces Reserve's *Criteria of Success*

Table 32.   Data for the charts of the evolution of active component's
perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's *Criteria of Success*

View of Marine Forces Reserve	Reservists with 18+ months of service	Difference between Reservists' perspective by category			
		Active component with 1-6 months of service	Active component with 6-12 months of service	Active component with 12-18 months of service	Active component with 18+ months of service
Clan Collaborate	27.19	1.16	1.18	0.27	0.16
Adhocracy Create	19.00	0.81	-1.99	1.25	-1.81
Market Compete	25.76	-1.83	-1.85	-2.18	1.27
Hierarchy Control	28.08	-0.17	2.62	0.62	0.34

Time of service inside Marine Forces Reserve was found normalize active component member's perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve's cultural propensities. Cultural beliefs by dimension of Marine Forces Reserve according to active component members evolve to match the perspectives of reservist in *strategic emphasis*, *criteria of success*, and *dominant characteristic*. Evolution in the dimensions of *organizational leadership*, *management of employees*, and *organizational glue* do not evolve toward reservists' cultural perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve. The lack of evolution to a completely mirrored state may be more reflective of the differences in experiences of active component within Marine Forces Reserve as compared to reservists. Active component Marines serve at the call of the organization every day and reservists may support Marine Forces Reserve as little as two days a month and as often as their civilian careers and personal desire permit.

E.   MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND PERSPECTIVES

Research Question 7: Does service within Marine Forces Reserve's major subordinate commands impact cultural perspectives of reservists?

Major subordinate commands within Marine Forces Reserve are charged with providing well-trained forces to the active component when additional manpower is desired by national need. Each command accomplishes this mission via the type of personnel they

provide. 4th Marine Division provides direct ground combat forces. General consensus is division personnel are competitive and aggressive *(market)*. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing provides air combat and support forces and those forces which support aviation assets. Personnel associated with the wing are thought to be more of a family, yet still results-oriented by nature *(clan* and *market)*. 4th Marine Logistics Group provides support units not involved in direct combat. Logistics personnel are generally not given any specific cultural norm due to the variety of their operational focus. Force Headquarters Group is an institution only existing within Marine Forces Reserve. It includes remaining reserve units that do not belong in any of the other three traditional major subordinate commands. Force Headquarters Group's status as multifarious and without equivalent means it is lacking in a sister organization for comparison purposes. Each of the units will have personnel with the mission of logistics, communications, administration, and other functions that are necessary to these commands' missions.

Results analyzing the four major subordinate commands by OCAI's four culture types show no significant deviation from those found in Section A, with the exception of 4th Marine Logistics Group's active component Marines' perspective of active units. The difference is likely due to only receiving six responses from 4th Marine Logistics Group. Low response rates may skew results away from the population average. In all other cases, responses between major subordinate commands do not deviate sufficiently to the level of significance. Table 33 through Table 36 provide specific data on these perspectives. Low number of respondents are highlighted by bold in the column title and yellow in column numbers.

Table 33.   Reservists perspective of active units by major subordinate command

Population and View		Reservists view of Active Unit Culture	4th Marine Division Reservists view of Active Unit Culture (n=206)	4th Marine Airwing Reservists view of Active Unit Culture (n=94)	4th Marine Logistics Group Reservists view of Active Unit Culture (n=108)	Force Headquarters Group Reservists view of Active Unit Culture (n=45)
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	26.83	26.21	28.59	27.34	25.56
	Adhocracy Create	19.87	18.67	19.20	22.71	21.31
	Market Compete	27.53	29.01	26.54	25.50	27.58
	Hierarchy Control	25.28	25.58	25.65	24.44	25.55
Difference from All Reservists view	Clan Collaborative	N/A	0.62	-1.75	-0.51	1.27
	Adhocracy Create		1.20	0.67	-2.84	-1.44
	Market Compete		-1.49	0.98	2.02	-0.05
	Hierarchy Control		-0.30	-0.37	0.84	-0.27

Table 34.   Active component perspective of active units by major subordinate command

Population and View		Active Component view of Active Unit Culture	4th Marine Division Active Component view of Active Unit Culture (n=198)	4th Marine Airwing Active Component view of Active Unit Culture (n=22)	4th Marine Logistics Group Active Component view of Active Unit Culture (n=6)	Force Headquarters Group Active Component view of Active Unit Culture (n=11)
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	26.36	25.90	30.16	20.21	29.18
	Adhocracy Create	20.08	20.20	16.96	22.71	23.28
	Market Compete	26.34	26.38	25.69	32.08	24.94
	Hierarchy Control	27.14	27.44	27.19	25.00	22.60
Difference from All Reservists view	Clan Collaborative	N/A	0.46	-3.80	6.15	-2.82
	Adhocracy Create		-0.12	3.12	-2.63	-3.19
	Market Compete		-0.03	0.65	-5.74	1.40
	Hierarchy Control		-0.30	-0.05	2.14	4.54

Table 35. Reservist perspective of Marine Forces Reserve by major subordinate command

Population and View		Reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture	4th Marine Division Reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=206)	4th Marine Airwing Reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=94)	4th Marine Logistics Group Reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=108)	Force Headquarters Group Reservists view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=45)
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	27.92	26.64	30.63	27.61	28.91
	Adhocracy Create	19.96	19.19	18.45	22.29	21.06
	Market Compete	26.68	28.43	25.11	25.57	24.67
	Hierarchy Control	25.43	25.74	25.84	24.52	25.37
Difference from All Reservists view	Clan Collaborative	N/A	1.29	-2.70	0.31	-0.98
	Adhocracy Create		0.77	1.51	-2.33	-1.09
	Market Compete		-1.75	1.58	1.11	2.02
	Hierarchy Control		-0.31	-0.40	0.91	0.07

Table 36. Active component perspective of Marine Forces Reserve by major subordinate command

Population and View		Active Component view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture	Division Active Component view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=198)	Airwing Active Component view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=22)	Logistics Group Active Component view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=6)	Headquarters Group Active Component view of Marine Forces Reserve Culture (n=11)
Characteristic Score	Clan Collaborative	26.41	26.60	25.31	22.36	28.67
	Adhocracy Create	19.93	20.09	18.79	20.28	18.00
	Market Compete	27.85	27.55	31.24	29.58	23.00
	Hierarchy Control	25.81	25.76	24.67	27.78	30.33
Difference from All Reservists view	Clan Collaborative	N/A	-0.19	1.10	4.05	-2.26
	Adhocracy Create		-0.17	1.14	-0.35	1.93
	Market Compete		0.31	-3.38	-1.73	4.85
	Hierarchy Control		0.05	1.14	-1.97	-4.52

1.   Integrating Reservists into the Active Forces by Major Subordinate Command

Reservist perspective of active units drastically shifts when considered as a function of the major subordinate command of service. When considered as a function of responses from all reservists, 4th Marine Division matches in five of the six dimensions, Force

86

Headquarters group matches in four of the six dimensions, and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and 4th Marine Logistics Group match in two dimensions.

Respondents in 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing may have defined active as active component Divisions or Aircraft Wings. Members of 4th Marine Logistics Group and Force Headquarters Group can serve in every major subordinate command in the active component; prohibiting accurate assumptions of the source of their responses. Due to the irregularity in response rate across major subordinate commands and uncertainty of response focus, this section's results should be considered with care.

a.   *Dominant Characteristic of All Dimensions by Major Subordinate Command*

Active component members and Force Headquarters Group believe the *dominant characteristic* is driven by a culture of competition *(market)*. Reservists from 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th Marine Logistics Group consider Marine Forces Reserve's culture to be dominated by care for its employees to be centered on creating a workplace focused on employees *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The *clan* focus of three of the four major subordinate commands should cause little concern, as *clan* is the secondary characteristic held by active component members, theoretically mitigating any concerns of reservists integrating into active forces in this dimension.

b.   *Organizational Leadership Dimension by Major Subordinate Command*

Responses in this section vary across three of the four types of culture. Active component members and 4th Marine Division reservists believe active unit leadership is culturally propensed to be hard driving *(market)*. Reservists from 4th Marine Aircraft and 4th Marine Logistic Group view Marine Forces Reserve's leadership as culturally driven to mentor, possibly to the level of being a parent figure *(clan)*. Reservists from Force Headquarters Group believes leadership is focused on managing well-run, efficient operations *(hierarchy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Reservists from 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Logistics Group, or Force Headquarters Group should have little time integrating into active units as they share either a primary culture type or a secondary culture type matching that held by active members. Marines of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing differ in their

opinions of active units from active component members; however, their perspective may match those of active units within an active force Marine Aircraft Wing.

c. Management of Employees Dimension by Major Subordinate Command

Three of the four major subordinate commands within Marine Forces Reserve share at least near or equivalent opinions believing Marines within active units are managed through demanding focus *(market)*. The sole outlier is 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists who view active unit management as focused on teamwork *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Members of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing likely viewed active force Marine Aircraft Wings when considering their response; negating any difference from the responses of the other three major subordinate commands.

d. Organizational Glue Dimension by Major Subordinate Command

Organizational glue finds a similarity or near similarity in responses for every major subordinate command to average of all reserve responses; which consider active unit cohesion created through loyalty and a strong tradition *(clan)*. The sole outlier is 4th Marine Division reservists who believe active unit solidarity is created through a focus on success *(market)*. This outlier status should have no impact upon integration into the active component as the primary and secondary characteristics as defined by all reservists and active component members are reversed within the responses of 4th Marine Division responses; likely eliminating any issue with integration into active forces.

e. Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Major Subordinate Command

Three of the four culture types are dominant in at least one major subordinate command. Active component members, 4th Marine Division reservists, and Force Headquarters Group reservists believe active unit's *strategic emphasis* is focused on maintaining competitive edge and accomplishing organizational goals *(market)*. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists believe active unit's strategically drive toward well-run, stable operations *(hierarchy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Active component members believe *hierarchy* to be an important culture type in strategic emphasis and hold it as a close secondary culture type after *market*. 4th Marine Logistics Group reservists consider active

unit success to be driven by investment in human resources. Shared perspective of *strategic emphasis* should make the integration into active units relatively seamless for the Marines of 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and Force Headquarters Group.

f. *Criteria of Success Dimension by Major Subordinate Command*

There is a split in how the *criteria of success* is defined for active forces. Active component members, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists, and 4th Marine Logistics Group reservists believe success occurs via well planned, financially feasible operations *(hierarchy)*. Reservists from 4th Marine Division and Force Headquarters Group find active unit success is culturally created through maintaining dominance in military capabilities *(market)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The shared perspectives of active component members, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists, and 4th Marine Logistics Group reservists should help the integration of reservists from these major subordinate commands. A summary of the six categories perspectives Marine Forces Reserve and active units by the six dimensions is summarized in Table 37.

Table 37.   Perspectives of active units by major subordinate command

% of Surveyed	Number of Responses	Component or Major Subordinate Command and Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
		Active Component	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY (M)	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
		Reservists		MARKET (C)	CLAN	CLAN	HIERARCHY (C)	HIERARCHY (C)
45%	206	4th Marine Division	Clan	Market	Market	Market	Market (H)	Hierarchy
21%	94	4th Marine Aircraft Wing	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan (H)
24%	108	4th Marine Logistics Group	Clan	Clan (M)	Clan	Clan (M)	Clan	Clan (H)
10%	45	Force Headquarters Group	Market (C)	Hierarchy	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan

Differences in opinions in the culture of active units between active component members and reservists by major subordinate commands assignment vary. Variance according to major subordinate command was found to negatively impact integration by an average of 4%. Active component opinions of active unit culture match those of reservists when reservists are considered by major subordinate command in 79% of

dimensions. The similarities between the opinions of active units and reservists by major subordinate command follow: 4th Marine Division: 83%, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing: 67%, 4th Marine Logistics Group: 83%, Force Headquarters Group: 83%. These results show a negative difference when compared to reservists opinions by region or status as an officer or enlisted member. These relationships are shown in Table 38, with differences highlighted using black diagonal lines.

Table 38.   Comparison of active unit opinions of active component members and reservists by major subordinate command

% of Surveyed	Number of Responses	Difference of Perspective of Active Units between Reservists by Major Subordinate Command Perspective and Active Component	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
	231	Active Comp	MARKET (C)	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN (M)	MARKET (H)	HIERARCHY
48%	201	4th Marine Division	Clan	Market	Market	Market (C)	Market	/////
21%	89	4th Marine Aircraft Wing	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy	Hierarchy
22%	92	4th Marine Logistics Group	Clan	Clan (M)	Clan (M)	Clan	/////	Hierarchy
9%	40	Force Headquarters Group	Market	Hierarchy (M)	Market	Clan	Market	/////

2.   Integration of Active Component Marines into Marine Forces Reserve by Major Subordinate Command

Those same cultural variances found by major subordinate command above will also have an impact in the integration of active component members into the ranks of those serving Marine Forces Reserve. In this case, active component members will need to work with an organization whose mission mirrors active component type; however, the personnel inside the organization may hold a different view. If disparity is found, it may impede the smooth integration into those organizations.

a.   *Dominant Characteristic of All Dimensions by Major Subordinate Command*

There is little change in perspective of Marine Forces Reserve by reservists, regardless of service within a particular major subordinate command. Active component members, 4th Marine Division reservists, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists, and 4th

Marine Logistics Group believe the culture of Marine Forces Reserve is driven by concern for people *(clan)*. Force Headquarters group believes Marine Forces Reserve's is dominated by an aggressive, results-oriented culture *(market)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Force Headquarters Group respondents also believes in *clan* as a close secondary culture type. The understanding of *clan* cultural dominance among all categories and active component members should eliminate any troubles with active members integrating into Marine Forces Reserve.

b. *Organizational Leadership Dimension by Major Subordinate Command*

There is a wide swath of beliefs as to how Marine Forces Reserve's leadership is culturally propensed, covering three of the four culture types. Active component members and reservists from 4th Marine Division believe Marine Forces Reserve's leadership is culturally focused toward driving results through demanding leadership *(market)*. The reservists of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and 4th Marine Logistics Group believe the *leadership* strives to focus on its Marines, possibly to the point where the organization is an extended family *(clan)*. Force Headquarters Group reservists finds Marine Forces Reserve leadership focused on well-planned and -run operations *(hierarchy)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Active component members share the primary or secondary culture type with the reservists of 4th Marine Division and 4th Marine Logistics Group. Active component members assigned to 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Headquarters group may experience dissonance during the tour associated with perceived *organizational leadership* cultural tendencies.

c. *Management of Employees Dimension by Major Subordinate Command*

Active component perspective does not match the view of reservists from any major subordinate command. Active component members believe Marine Forces Reserve manages its Marines through a predictable, secure environment *(hierarchy)*. Reservists from 4th Marine Division believe management is through creating a competitive nature *(market)*. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists, 4th Marine Logistics Group reservists, and Force Headquarters Group reservists find Marine Forces Reserve's personnel to be managed through consensus and teamwork *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). The lack of

comparable reserve perspective to active component perspective about how Marine Forces Reserve manages its Marines may cause issues for active component Marines' integration into Marine Forces Reserve.

d. Organizational Glue Dimension by Major Subordinate Command

Active component perspective does not match the primary view of reservists from any major subordinate command; however, the secondary culture of active component members does match 4th Marine Division reservists. Active component members find Marine Forces Reserve's cohesion is built through statutes, rules, and policies *(hierarchy)*. 4th Marine Division reservists find solidarity in Marine Forces Reserve is created by a drive for success *(market)*. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing reservists, 4th Marine Logistics Group reservists, and Force Headquarters Group reservists believe unity within Marine Forces Reserve is created through institutional commitment and a strong tradition *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Active component members will likely have a strong understanding for what binds Marine Forces Reserve when they serve within 4th Marine Division. Service elsewhere may cause some cognitive dissonance.

e. Strategic Emphasis Dimension by Major Subordinate Command

Active component members' perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve's strategic focus are not mirrored by any of the four major subordinate commands. Active component members believe the goal of Marine Forces Reserve is to achieve smooth, well-run operations *(hierarchy)*. 4th Marine Division reservists find the strategic emphasis of Marine Forces Reserve to be through the achievement of long-term, institutional goals *(market)*. The other three major subordinate commands find the development of human capital to be central to the success of Marine Forces Reserve *(clan)* (Cameron & Quinn, 2011). Active component members integrating into the ranks of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Marine Logistics Group, or Force Headquarters Group may face some cognitive dissonance with regards to beliefs of the *strategic emphasis* within Marine Forces Reserve.

f. Criteria of Success Dimension by Major Subordinate Command

Active component members should find cultural parity when serving in three of the four major subordinate commands. Active component members and 4th Marine Division reservists define success in Marine Forces Reserve as occurring when operations are fiscally responsible and well run. Reservists from 4th Marine Aircraft Wing and 4th Marine Logistics Group hold the same cultural belief in high regard as a close secondary cultural perspective. Reservists from 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th Marine Logistics Group, and Force Headquarters Group believe success within Marine Forces Reserve is found through care of its people. Active component members will have little issue understanding metrics for success within 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, or 4th Marine Division as they share either primary or secondary cultural characteristics. Active component se assigned to service within Force Headquarters Group may have some trouble understanding the culture driving success. A visual summary of how all reservists and major subordinate commands perceive Marine Forces Reserve according to the six dimensions is found in Table 39.

Table 39. Perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve by major subordinate command

% of Surveyed	Number of Responses	Component or Major Subordinate Command and Perspective of Active Units	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
	231	Active Comp.	MARKET (C)	MARKET	MARKET	CLAN (M)	MARKET (H)	HIERARCHY
	422	All Reservists	CLAN			CLAN	MARKET	MARKET
48%	201	4th Marine Division	Clan	Market	Market	Market (C)	Market	Market
21%	89	4th Marine Aircraft Wing	Clan	Clan	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy	Hierarchy
22%	92	4th Marine Logistics Group	Clan	Clan (M)	Clan (M)	Clan	Clan	Hierarchy
9%	40	Force Headquarters Group	Market	Hierarchy (M)	Market	Clan	Market	Market

Active component opinions of Marine Forces Reserve continue to not concur with those of reservists and likely will cause dissonance when active members integrate into the ranks of Marine Forces Reserve. The results show none of the four major subordinate commands encounter seamless integration between cultural assumptions of active

93

component and reservists across the six dimensions. Concurrence with active component members' opinions occurs as follows in major subordinate commands: 4th Marine Division in 83% of dimensions, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing in 33% of dimensions, 4th Marine Logistics Group in 66% of dimensions, and Force Headquarters Group in 17% of dimensions.

Overall, concurrence in opinions of Marine Forces Reserve's cultural norms between reservists by assignment in a major subordinate command and active component members occurs in 50% of the dimensions studied. Major subordinate command of service was found to negatively impact cultural concurrence by an average of 17% during the integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve. Active component members should expect cultural dissonance when serving within Marine Forces Reserve. Specifics of these findings are shown in Table 40. Cells where reserve primary or secondary cultural perceptions do not match that of active members' primary or secondary cultural perceptions are shown shaded with diagonal lines.

Table 40.   Comparison of Marine Forces Reserve opinions of active component members and reservists by major subordinate command

% of Surveyed	Number of Responses	Difference of Perspective of Marine Forces Reserve between Reservists by Major Subordinate Command Perspective and Active Component	Dominant Characteristic	Organizational Leadership	Management of Employees	Organizational Glue	Strategic Emphasis	Criteria of Success
		Active Component	CLAN	MARKET	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY (M)	HIERARCHY	HIERARCHY
45%	206	4th Marine Division	Clan	Market		Market	Market (H)	Hierarchy
21%	94	4th Marine Aircraft Wing	Clan					Clan (H)
24%	108	4th Marine Logistics Group	Clan	Clan (M)		Clan (M)		Clan (H)
10%	45	Force Headquarters Group	Market (C)					

Perspectives of the culture of Marine Forces Reserve vary significantly. Active component members entering into service within Marine Forces Reserve should expect a different cultural experience based upon major subordinate command of assignment. The experience in 4th Marine Division will likely be as expected with heavy focus on results-orientation. The experiences within 4th Marine Aircraft Wing or 4th Marine Logistics Group will likely be Marine-centric. The lack of a comparable major subordinate command in the active forces should lead active component members assigned to Force Headquarters

Group to take the assignment with an open mind as to how the organization culturally leads. In all cases, major subordinate command assignment will impact the cultural experience of active component members and should be considered.

F. RESULTS SUMMARY

This section studied the impact on cultural perception according to reservists' region of service, status as an enlisted or officer, time in service within Marine Forces Reserve, and by reservists' service within a major subordinate command. Analysis by four culture types yielded little differentiation between active component and reservist perspective. Analysis by the dimensions of culture provided needed depth and revealed limited differences in opinions of active units; regardless of consideration of regionality, status as an enlisted or officer, or major subordinate command of assignment. Differentiation by dimension yielded important insights as to how each of those same variables has a large impact upon perceptions of active and reserve members when considering the culture of Marine Forces Reserve.

Furthermore, the analysis showed active component opinions of Marine Forces Reserve evolved over time; however, the evolution was not shown to occur strictly toward reservists' opinions of Marine Forces Reserve. In half the dimensions studied, opinions evolved toward that of reservists. The other half showed evolution of opinions, but not toward those of reservists.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V.   SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A.   SUMMARY

Cameron and Quinn's four culture types and dimensions provided a viable method to evaluate the differences in perception in active component and reservist opinions of both Marine Forces Reserve and active units. The similarities and differences give insights as to where differences exist when reservists mobilize into active units and when active component members serve within Marine Forces Reserve. The study showed there are differences in opinions of nearly every category studied. Opinions were found to vary minimally between active and reserve members when focused on active units but varied up to significantly when considering opinions of Marine Forces Reserve.

1.   Integrating Reservists into the Active Forces

Reservists integrating with active units must be prepared to interact with the reality of a culture potentially only experienced through the visage of a reservists' initial training pipeline, previous mobilizations, or through the offered experiences of active duty members assigned to serve in Marine Forces Reserve. This research shows only one dimension of the six differs by cultural expectations. When reservists are analyzed by region, they concur with active component member's perspective of the cultural norms of active units on average 92% of the time, with non-concurrence only occurring in the perceived dominant characteristic and criteria of success.

Analysis by status as an officer or enlisted member shows reservist agreement in opinion of active unit culture 100% of the time with active component officers and 92% of the time with active component enlisted members. Cultural understanding, regardless of region or status as an officer or enlisted member, is relatively strong across the components when comparing their opinions of the active unit culture.

Cultural difference according to major subordinate commands yields concurrence between active component member's perspective and reservists assigned to 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Marine Logistics Group, and Force Headquarters Group 79% of the time. No single dimension finds concurrence among every major

subordinate command and active component opinions. In four of the six dimensions, the sole detractor to active component opinions is 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. This non-concurrence is likely due to their expectation that active force Marine Aircraft Wings match the culture of 4th Marine Aircraft Wing. This assumption, while likely valid, cannot be proven unless surveying of those units occurs in future research.

2. Integration of Active Component Marines into Marine Forces Reserve

Active component members receiving orders to serve on an Inspector-Instructor staff may have large cultural challenge ahead of them learning to operate in a reserve-centric world after a career among active component personnel in active units. General concurrence between active component and reservists on the culture of Marine Force Reserve occurs in four of the six dimensions to set the concurrence level at 67%. Conducting the same comparison through the visage of reservists' opinions by region drops agreement from 67% to 50%. In only one of the six dimensions is there concurrence with active component members and reservists regardless of region. Furthermore, active component members responses failed to match a single region's responses exactly. The closest active component members neared to a single region was concurrence in four of the six dimensions in one region.

Concurrence was similarly fleeting when comparing active component and reservist responses defining Marine Forces Reserve's culture according to a respondent's status as an officer or enlisted member. Active component members match the perception of reservist officer's opinions of Marine Forces Reserve 50% of the time with complete concurrence in three of the six dimensions. Active component concurrence with reservist enlisted member perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve occurred 67% of the time with complete concurrence in four of the six dimensions. The research shows a substantial difference in perception of Marine Forces Reserve, which will likely hinder the effectiveness of active component personnel to instruct and inspect reservists. Additionally, these differences may make it more difficult for reservists to learn their art from the active component experts.

Active component opinions of Marine Forces Reserve were found to evolve throughout their service within Marine Forces Reserve. Evolution among dominant characteristic, strategic emphasis and criteria of success occurred toward the opinions of reservists. Active component opinions of Marine Forces Reserve's organizational leadership, management of employees and organizational glue occurred, but not toward the opinions of reservists. Among the four culture types, only adhocracy evolved to a mirrored status among active component and reservists, showing both components do not feel Marine Forces Reserve is culturally creative.

Analysis of Marine Forces Reserve's major subordinate commands shows concurrence with the responses of all reservists 50% of the time. The shift in dynamics among major subordinate commands increased concurrence with active component member's perception of Marine Forces Reserve's culture from 67% to 50%.

Overall, reservists mobilizing for service among active units should experience significantly less of a cultural dissonance to overcome than active component members given orders to serve in Marine Forces Reserve. A summary of cultural variances is shown in Table 41.

Table 41.   Found variances in perspectives

Perspective	Overall	By Reservists' region of service	By status as an Officer or Enlisted	By reservists' major subordinate command assignment
Reserve parity with active component perspective of active units	83%	92%	96%	79%
Active parity with reservist's perspective of Marine Forces Reserve	67%	50%	63%	50%

B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Conclusions

Research Question 1: How do active component and reservists view the culture of Marine Forces Reserve and active duty units and what differs between perspectives?

Differences were found between reservist and active opinions of Marine Forces Reserve and active units but not to the level assumed. Reservists found Marine Forces Reserve and active units more flexible than their active counterparts found either organization, but significant as defined by Cameron and Quinn. Active component and reserve Marines differ in opinion with regard to active forces' dominant characteristic and criteria of success and Marine Forces Reserves' *Management of Employees* and *Organizational Glue*.

Research Question 2: Does a reservists' region of assignment impact reservists' view of active units?

Regional differences were found in how reservists view active units and Marine Forces Reserve. Reservists' perspectives of the active forces did not yield any significant differences when considered by reservists' region of origin. Results showed all dimensions shared either the primary or close secondary culture type when compared to the average of all reservists. Primary culture types are defined as those receiving the largest ratio of points allocated for any individual or group average. A secondary culture type is only discussed when its ratio lies within one point of the primary characteristic, belying a near parity in attribution to the primary Reservists' perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve also failed to yield noteworthy differences. Midwest reservists' responses twice resulted in near-significant differences; however, none of the results passed the five-point marker signifying substantial disparities. Dimensional perspectives yield more similarities than differences between regional reservists and the average of all reservists. Concurrence of perspectives of active units between active component members and reservists by regions occurs in 83% of dimensions studied.

Research Question 3: Does status as an officer or enlisted member of either the active component or reserves impact perceptions of active unit culture?

Active component officers found active units to be significantly more focused on the market type of culture. This tendency carried over into the officer dimensions where every dimension had either the primary or secondary culture type as market. Enlisted members found active units to be slightly more propensed toward the market culture. Enlisted members were less likely to find dimensions strictly associated with the market culture. Active component officers found Marine Forces Reserve to have a heavy focus in the *hierarchy* type of culture. Enlisted members found Marine Forces Reserve to be more focused on the clan type of culture. Active component officers and enlisted found Marine Forces Reserve to be more hierarchy-centric when viewed through the six dimensions. Concurrence of perspectives of active units between active component members and reservists by status as an officer or enlisted member occurs in 96% of dimensions studied.

Research Question 4: Does assignment by region impact the integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve?

Region of service for reservists has a strong impact upon the integration of active component members culturally integrating into Marine Forces Reserve. Results showed deviation from the average or consideration of the average as a close secondary characteristic occurred 50% of the time when considered by region.

Research Question 5: Does status as an officer or enlisted member of either the active component or reserves impact perceptions of Marine Forces Reserve?

Status as an officer or enlisted reservist component has a strong impact in the integration of active component members into Marine Forces Reserve. Active enlisted members and officers have differing perspectives of reserve culture when compared to both reserve officer and reserve enlisted members. Concurrence of perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve between active component members and reservists by status as an office or enlisted occurs in 63% of dimensions studied.

101

Research Question 6: Does active component perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's culture evolve toward reservists' perspective during their tour as a member of an Inspector-Instructor staff?

Active component perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's culture through the visage of Cameron and Quinn's dimensions was proven to evolve over time. The evolution of active component opinions evolve toward that of reservists' opinions of Marine Forces Reserve occurs in *Dominant Characteristic, Strategic Emphasis,* and *Criteria of Success.* Evolution of active component perspective of Marine Forces Reserve's perspective of *Organizational Leadership, Management of Employees,* and *Organizational Glue*, but the evolution does not occur toward that of the opinions held by reservists in these same dimensions. The discrepancy in how opinions of how cultural beliefs change in *Organizational Leadership, Management of Employees,* and *Organizational Glue* do not necessarily speak to a good or bad result. Inspector-Instructor staffs serve in different roles than drilling reservists. There are likely cases where the different views of Marine Forces Reserve are strictly due to differences in the scope of responsibility.

Research Question 7: Does service within a Marine Forces Reserve major subordinate command impact cultural perceptions of reservists?

Regardless of perspective toward active units or Marine Forces Reserve, shifts were found when breaking up survey results by major subordinate command. Opinions of active units when comparing active component responses and responses of reservists by major subordinate command were aligned 79% of the time. Similar categorical opinions, but focused toward Marine Forces Reserve, found alignment only 50% of the time. The difference may be linked to members of those organizations considering "active units" the equivalent active component major subordinate command in active units. If so, perceptions of an active unit Marine Aircraft Wing are likely different from those of an active unit Marine Division or Marine Logistics Group. The likely variance in focus of unit considered in response may make assumptions difficult to attribute to the total force.

2. Recommendations

a. *Reservists Mobilizing to Support Active Units*

(1)   Reservists mobilized to support active component mission should be educated as to how active units likely have a mission-accomplishment, vice family-oriented, dominant characteristic with a criterion of success bound through mastery of tactic, techniques, and procedures, vice results orientation. Marine Forces Reserve can improve the differences through creating a mandatory pre-mobilization class requiring senior I-I leadership to discuss cultural differences with those mobilizing.

(2)   Active component and reserve officers tend to have a stronger difference of opinion of both Marine Forces Reserve and active units. This likely speaks to reserve officers either remembering experiences gained in the active forces as junior officer or normalizing their opinion of the active forces to those experienced at Marine Forces Reserve as a senior officer. Marine Forces Reserve should consider advocating transitioning officers to individual mobilization augmentee program billets within active forces between tours at Marine Forces Reserve. These tours should renormalize officers to a more senior perspective of the active forces. Furthermore, Marine Forces Reserve should either advocate more individual mobilization augmentee billets become assigned to Marine Expeditionary Force units or seek additional officer participation in active exercises during quarterly Force Synchronization Conferences.

b. *Active Component Marines Assigned to Inspector-Instructor Duty*

(1)   Active component Inspector-Instructors might consider hosting a semi-annual retired reservist forum. The forum should be made up of retired E7-E9s, CWO4-CWO5s, and O5-O6s with the goal of the local retired reservists giving their perspective on their experiences as a reservist. Using local retirees will purposefully create a learning environment based upon the culture of their region. Although not associated with learning culture, this recommendation will further create a bridge between the local units, their history, and potentially the community at large.

(2)   Learning the culture of Marine Forces Reserve after three to 27 years of serving in the active forces can be a difficult. Understanding will likely come through one of two methods: 1) interactions with reservists and 2) the Inspector-Instructor Conference. The first can happen at any time and requires active engagement by leadership through General Officers. The latter is controllable and may be a level Marine Forces Reserve can further utilize to help active members assigned within its ranks. Marine Forces Reserve should consider the possibility of shifting the Inspector-Instructor conference to a semi-annual event, vice annual. The annual conference is

likely the greatest tool to improve active component member's understanding of Marine Forces Reserve. In cases where active component members check into their new units a week after the conference, it will take nearly a year until they are afforded an opportunity to attend. Delay of this length can come at the cost of half of a tour for Commanders and Sergeants Major and a third of a tour for everyone else.

C.   STATUS QUO AS AN OPTION

Marine Forces Reserve may decide the differences between components is a valuable characteristic to maintain. Reservists have proven themselves with distinction during World War I, World War II, The Korean Conflict, Desert Storm, and Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps the differences found in reservists and their culture are beneficial to the nation because they provide a reflection of the U.S.'s citizenry.

On the other side, reservists' regular source of interaction is through their unit's Inspector-Instructor staff. Allowing active component members to continue to experience cultural friction may be beneficial to reservists when they mobilize in support of the active forces. The regularly renewed friction may serve as a continuous reminder of the differences in culture and help reservists mentally prepare for an eventual cultural shift during mobilizations.

D.   UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

This research has been instrumental in providing a better perspective on how active and reserve members view their culture and the culture of their peer in another component. More robust results can be found through increased survey participation. The survey takes roughly 10–15 minutes to complete and could easily be sent to the force for responses. Furthermore, the email delivery method used late in our project proved to be highly successful among reservists and members on active component alike. Proper coordination, with timelines determined after agreement with Commanding Generals and the Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, should result in a vast improvement in the total submissions; which will increase the power of the findings.

Surveyors may also wish to shift the time in service variable to allow for greater understanding beyond the 18-month mark using three-month spreads. The current study

assumes normalization occurs after 18 months when more time may be necessary. Six-month spreads may be better suited for evaluation, for example: 1–6 months, 7–12 months, etc., through 48+ months). If shifts continue through 48 months, with a statistically significant portion of Marine Forces Reserve surveyed, perhaps normalization of perspective never occurs. Furthermore, consideration should be given to allowing respondents to enter months of service without binning responses in periods. Evolution over specified months of service would provide intriguing results on a monthly basis. Increased tracking of timelines on a month-to-month basis should show specific details on the evolution of cultural perceptions and possibly may show stabilization, if it ever occurs.

Rank should also be added to the surveys. Rank can provide insights into how individuals respond as they mature in military service. Insights as to the perspective differences between junior and senior ranks within the active components and reservists would provide invaluable insights for the leadership of Marine Forces Reserve and help to direct training where it is better suited. This variable would add challenges to maintaining anonymity and may result in the survey dropping Battalion/Squadron or Regiment/Group level command from a considered demographic. Strictly pulling major subordinate commands would meet the requirement for understanding large organization culture.

Education accomplishment of bachelors and master's degrees of enlisted Marines has likely increased over time. Furthermore, many reservists join the Marine Corps Reserves while attending college. These differing levels of education, with a possible greater saturation within the reserve ranks, may impact how individuals view Marine Forces Reserve and active units and should be considered in future surveys.

Unlike their active component counterparts whose participation in their household income can be defined via annually published pay scales and entitlements, income from reservists varies significantly. Reservists can hold jobs including all levels of responsibility and pay. Reservists can be unemployed, in entry-level jobs, serve as managers of many levels, professors with doctorates, or CEOs of fortune 500 companies. Income differences may have an impact with how reservists view Marine Forces Reserve and active units and should be considered.

Future surveys may desire to shift the point of perspective to one more familiar to respondents. The current survey asked Marines to offer their perspectives of Marine Forces Reserve and active units. Respondents may have answered Marine Forces Reserve's column thinking of their local unit, battalion, regiment, major subordinate command, or Marine Forces Reserve. Furthermore, the second column "active units" may have not directed respondents sufficiently to allow for clear, equivalent responses across surveying. Future surveys should seek to analyze using major subordinate commands as the largest organization. This will require making three surveys and shifting from Marine Forces Reserve to 4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Marine Logistics Group, and Force Headquarters Group. Active units will need to transition to active force Marine Division, Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Logistics Group, and Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group. The resulting equivalent comparisons should provide a deeper cultural understanding. Furthermore, if the survey is designed so senior members who have served in multiple major subordinate commands, active and reserve, can provide perspective on all, the responses may provide amazing clarity on culture.

Demographics always matter when analyzing culture. In particular, future studies should consider gender, age, race, and ethnicity. Greater depth in demographics will permit additional details that can help tailor results and provide insights into retention tools.

Individual sensitivity will need be catered to as information density increases. There is likely a point where surveying will need to shift to a website and randomly assigned participant code, vice an excel spreadsheet emailed from a personal account to an NPS student. A website can simplify some questions as follows: 1) Location determined by selecting a region on a map, 2) Unit type limited to MSC or O6 command via a pull-down menu, 3) Demographics, 4) a disclaimer noting individual information will not be shared with Marine Forces Reserve at the beginning of the survey. Furthermore, an online survey should result in automatic tabulation, increasing accuracy.

Future research should seek at minimum 30 observations per category desired in the lowest level unit researched. A minimum number of observations should provide a viable average for the category of interest. A majority of significant findings in this study were associated with a limited number of observations in sub-units preventing deep

analysis in 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Marine Logistics Group, and Force Headquarters Group. 4th Marine Division's generous participation permitted their analysis in most, but not all areas considered.

E.   THINGS TO CONSIDER

Marine Forces Reserve should consider conducting an OCAI-based leadership study on its senior leaders. A round of surveying using the Management Skills Assessment Instrument (Cameron & Quinn, 2011, kindle location 2685) should provide interesting insights into disparities and similarities of the components' perspectives of leadership at the Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel levels within Marine Forces Reserve. The leadership study can be accomplished by tasking active component and reservist leaders to complete the leadership survey upon assumption of command and one month prior to turning over their command. If this is done with all slated commanders over a three-year period, it will result in every command within Marine Forces Reserve represented in the survey. The survey results should provide both an interesting perspective on how leadership views evolve among active and reserve commanders.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

10 U.S. Code § 101. (2017). Definitions. Retrieved 18 October 2018 from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/101

10 U.S. Code § 531. (2004). Original appointments of commissioned officers. Retrieved 21 September from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/531

10 U.S. Code § 571. (2004). Warrant Officers: Grades. Retrieved 21 September from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/571

10 U.S. Code § 701. (2016). Entitlement and accumulation. Retrieved 20 September 2018 from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/701

10 U.S. Code § 802. (2016). General provisions. Retrieved 1 November 2018 from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/subtitle-A/part-II/chapter-47/subchapter-I

10 U.S. Code § 1030–1154. (2016). Chapters 53 through 58 of 10 U.S. Code. Retrieved 1 November 2018 from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/subtitle-A/part-II

10 U.S. Code § 10147. (2002). Ready Reserve: Training requirements. Retrieved 19 October 2018 from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/10147

10 U.S. Code § 12731. (2014). Age and service requirements. Retrieved 19 October 2019, from: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/12731

Cameron, K. S., & Quinn, R. E. (2011). *Diagnosing and changing organizational culture: Based on the competing values framework.* [Kindle Version.]

Cameron, K. S., & Ettington, D. R. (1988). *The conceptual foundation of organizational culture*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan. Retrieved from: https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/35462/b1410477.0001.001.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. Working Paper #544

Choi, Y., Seok, M., Scott, D., & Martin, J. J. (2010). Validation of the organizational culture assessment instrument: An application of the Korean version. *Journal of Sport Management*, *24*(2), pp. 169–189.

Department of Defense Directorate of Information Operations and Reports. (1997). Military manpower statistics. Retrieved October 19, 2018, from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a340114.pdf

Department of Defense. (2016). *Accessing the Reserve Component (RC)* (1235.12).
    Retrieved 18 October, 2018 from
    http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/123512p.pdf

Hartnell, C., Ou, A., & Kinicki, A. (2011). Organizational culture and organizational
    effectiveness: A meta-analytic investigation of the competing values frameworks
    theoretical suppositions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *96*(4), pp. 677–694.
    doi:10.1037/a0021987.supp

Helfrich, C., Li, Y., Mohr, D., Meterko, M., & Anne, S. (2007). Assessing an
    organizational culture instrument based on the competing values framework:
    Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. *Implementation Science*, *2*(1).
    doi:10.1186/1748-5908-2-13

Heritage, B., Pollock, C., & Roberts, L. (2014). Validation of the organizational culture
    assessment instrument. *PLoS ONE*, *9*(3), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092879.

Howard, L. (1998). Validating the competing values model as a representation of
    organizational cultures. *The International Journal of Organizational Analysis*,
    6(3), pp. 231–250, doi:10.1108/eb028886

Jung, T., Scott, T., Davies, H., Bower, P., Whalley, D., McNally, R., & Mannion, R.
    (2009). Instruments for exploring organizational culture: A review of the
    literature. *Public Administration Review*, *69*(6), pp. 1087–1096,
    doi:10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.02066.x.

Kwan, P., & Walker, A. (2004). Validating the competing values model as a
    representation of organizational culture through inter-institutional
    comparisons. *Organizational Analysis*, *12*(1), pp. 21–37, doi:10.1108/eb028984

Leonard, G., Hernandez, A., & Hatch, W. (Eds.) (2017). A multidisciplinary studies
    support for U.S. Marine Forces Reserve [Research Contract].

Lund, D. (2003). Organizational culture and job satisfaction. *Journal of Business &
    Industrial Marketing*, *18*(3), pp. 219–236, doi:10.1108/0885862031047313

Marine Corps. (2018). *Guidance for reserve officer commissioning program (ROCP)
    professional development tour (PDT)* (MARADMIN 578/18). Retrieved from
    www.marines.mil/News/Messages/Messages-Display/Article/1656192/updated-
    guidance-for-reserve-officer-commissioning-program-rocp-professional-de/

Marine Corps. (2018). *Marine Corps reserve administration management manual* (MCO
    1001R.1L). Retrieved Oct 18, 2018, from
    https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCO%201001R.1L%20W%20
    CH%201.pdf?ver=2018-08-03-131432-417

Marine Corps. (2014). *Marine Corps personnel assignment policy* (MCO 1300.8). Retrieved Oct 18, 2018, from https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/MCO%201300.8.pdf

Marine Corps. (2018). *Military occupational specialty manual* (NAVMC 1200.1D). Retrieved from https://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/wtbn/MCCMOS/FY19%20MOS%20Manual%20NAVMC_1200.1D.PDF?ver=2018-05-16-070623-087

Marine Forces Reserve. (2016). Marine Corps Reserves centennial. Retrieved from www.marforres.marines.mil/usmcr100/history/

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2018. (2018). Public Law 91. Retrieved Oct 18, 2018, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2810/text

Paparone, C. (2003). Applying the competing values framework to study organizational subcultures and system-wide planning efforts in a military university. The Pennsylvania State University.

Pierce, J. (2010). The Letort Papers is the organizational culture of the U.S. Army congruent with the professional development of its senior level officer corps? *Semantic Scholar.* Retrieved from www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Letort-Papers-IS-THE-ORGANIZATIONAL-CULTURE-OF-Pierce/3e9f5211e38281ea7a28ca8745a4026f36cd7f85

Pollman, A. (2015). Diagnosis and analysis of Marine Corps organizational culture. Naval Postgraduate School, www.researchgate.net/publication/324808425

Pollman, A. (2018). Framing Marine Corps culture. *Proceedings Magazine.* Retrieved October 18, 2018, from https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018-06/framing-marine-corps-culture

Psychology.iresearchnet.com. (n.d.). Normative vs. ipsative measurement. Retrieved from: psychology.iresearchnet.com/industrial-organizational-psychology/i-o-psychology-theories/normative-vs-ipsative-measurement/.

Quinn, R., & Rohrbaugh, J. (1983). A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: Towards a competing values approach to organizational analysis. *Management Science*, *29*(3), pp. 363–377. doi:10.1287/mnsc.29.3.363.

Suderman, J. (2012). Using the organizational cultural assessment instrument (OCAI) as a tool for new team development. *Journal of Practical Consulting*, *4*(1), pp. 52–58.

United States Census Bureau. (n.d.). Census regions and divisions of the United States. Retrieved 18 October 2018 from www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf

USMC Concepts & Programs (2018). Marine Corps almanac. Retrieved 23 October 2019 from www.candp.marines.mil/almanac/

Yu, T., & Wu, N. (2009). A review of study on the competing values framework. *International Journal of Business and Management*, 4(7). doi:10.5539/ijbm.v4n7p37

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1.   Defense Technical Information Center
        Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2.   Dudley Knox Library
        Naval Postgraduate School
        Monterey, California